

EASTERN WORLD



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Malaya in the Melting Pot

by

D. R. REES-WILLIAMS, M.P.

Modern Tibet

by

EDWIN HAWARD

ONE SHILLING AND SIXPENCE

"EASTERN WORLD" fills a long missing gap in the British magazine world, and is the first British journalistic publication which devotes itself to the mission of creating a live link between this country and the Far East.

It has been designed to express the great interest shown in this country in Eastern affairs by explaining the British point of view to readers in the Far East, while at the same time following closely all developments in the Far East in order to inform British readers on the political, economic and cultural situation in that part of the world.

"EASTERN WORLD" has found the utmost encouragement by people who matter in Far Eastern affairs and who are able to shape policy and to influence commercial developments in that area. The new magazine is being subscribed by officials of the British, Chinese, Burmese, Indian, Dutch, French, Malayan and other Governments, by the leading industrialists of the biggest concerns in the Far East and in Europe, as well as by political and commercial organisations of importance, but it will be distributed at the same time to university institutes, economic associations, hotels, to air and shipping lines and to all important clubs.

The Far East, with its vast and mostly undeveloped markets, is of the utmost importance to this country. Developments in India, Indo China, Siam, Burma, China, Japan and Korea, as well as in the Dutch East Indies and the Pacific are likely to have the most vital consequences on the political and economic situation in this country.

While large territories are gradually severing or loosening their ties with the British Empire, others are by now tacitly accepted as American spheres of interest. On the other hand, it is known beyond doubt that there is a considerable good will towards British goods in the East, and that the British point of view concerning political developments there is not sufficiently made clear to the peoples in the East.

Yet, while the Americans are publishing a large number of magazines dealing with Far Eastern affairs, the existing British periodicals specialising on that subject are either predominantly trade or commercial publications, or academic papers, unlikely to reach other than strictly commercial circles or a small group of intellectuals.

The new magazine deals with a great variety of subjects, ranging from policy and economy in the Far East to book reviews, art, hygiene and education, and will devote its space to serious investigations in these fields by authoritative and prominent journalists or outstanding personalities connected with Far Eastern problems.

"EASTERN WORLD," therefore, will appeal to those who desire to foster good relations between the Far East and this country by the introduction of constructive proposals which will promote the raising of the living standard amongst the peoples of Eastern Asia which, in return, will show important results in the extension of British markets there.

EASTERN WORLD

IMPORTANCE OF FAR EAST.

It is amazing how little interest has been taken in Far Eastern affairs in this country up to now, or indeed, in any other country in Europe. The great convulsions that now face both India and China make the rest of the petty disturbances in little countries in Europe seem like storms in a teacup. With some nine hundred million, in other words, half the population of the world, faced with imminent chaos, it seems odd that people can get so excited over minor disturbances in countries like Greece, Yugoslavia or Poland. The destiny of the world is now being decided six to ten thousand miles away and it does at least merit a casual glance by public men and others in Europe. Whatever faults and weaknesses the United States may have, they, at least, have always paid great attention to the Far East and they are not blind to what is going on in Chinese or Indian waters at this moment.

A HAPPY OMEN.

The Foreign Affairs debate in the British House of Commons, which was dull and prosaic on Thursday, May 15th, livened up on Friday, with the removal of the arena to the Far East. There were excellent speeches on this subject, and the Foreign Secretary himself appeared to welcome a breath of air from the hot spicy winds of the Orient. Mr. Bevin singled out three Members for congratulation on their speeches, and at the end made a handsome offer to those interested in the Far East. He suggested that they should see him at any time, when he would be happy to consult with them, take their advice and do what he could to promote British interests and British culture in this great area. This is a most happy omen, for up to now little attention has been paid in the House of Commons to the problems of the Far

East as such, and seen against the general background. Isolated problems have been dealt with, such as the case of Indonesia or India, but this is the first occasion on which there has been a general survey of the needs and anxieties of this whole theatre.

KOREAN POSITION IMPROVES.

In the same debate, Mr. Bevin, replying to Mr. Rees-Williams, dealt with the position in Korea. As Mr. Rees-Williams pointed out, the difficulty has been the failure of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. to agree to the form of government in Korea, although at Yalta and Potsdam the country was divided at the 38th parallel for military occupation purposes by the two great powers; Russia was to take the northern portion and U.S.A. the southern. After Yalta, the position concerning Korea was clarified by association, and it was agreed that there should be a short-term four-power trusteeship, consisting of U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K. and China. This will provide a basis for an independent State in the future. Unfortunately, however, there has been no satisfactory progress towards even the four-power trusteeship, leave alone the independent State. The Americans and the Russians have differed materially over the political policies pursued in their respective areas, with a disastrous effect upon the political and economic life of the community. Just lately the position has improved as the result of exchange between Mr. Marshall and Mr. Molotov, and it has now been agreed to resume the meeting of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, whose object is to establish the provisional government, leading to the setting up of a four-power trusteeship.

INDIAN DEADLOCK.

While this goes to print, Lord Mountbatten is still in London, and the Cabinet's plan "for the transfer of power to Indian hands," to be presented to the Indian leaders on June 2nd, has not been published. As it is clear, however, that Britain is determined to fulfil her pledges, and that her principal endeavour is to hand over her responsibilities to a working ad-

ministration, interest centres on developments in India rather than Whitehall. These developments are, unfortunately, far from encouraging and the communal riots have flared up again to such a degree that it takes academic punctiliousness not to describe the situation as civil war. The gulf between the Indian leaders, which the Viceroy's outstanding ability and impressive personality and tact appeared to have narrowed, is again wider than ever.

The hopes of a United India, even of a united Bengal, Punjab or Assam seem to be shattered, and Mr. Jinnah's uncompromising statement on May 20th seems to have complicated matters even more. His demand for a corridor through Hindustan to connect the two Pakistan provinces in North-Eastern and North-Western India, which would mean a 700 mile long danger zone, and his renewed demand for a division of the Indian Army, are heralding the grave times India will have to face in the near future. What corridors can do has been seen in the European example in the case of Poland. The splitting of the Army would certainly precipitate further deterioration in the communal strife and divide India into two armed camps, apart from destroying the finest Army in Asia. Nobody is happy about the situation, neither British nor Indians. As the Indians themselves have to decide ultimately on the fate of their country, the British plan cannot be more than a proposal, but it may be hoped that the attitude of the Indian States may have some stabilising and balancing influence on developments. Yet it is not clear at the time of writing, whether the resignation of the Nawab of Bhopal from the Chancellorship of the Chamber of Princes indicates his joining forces with Hyderabad, Travancore and the other larger States outside Congress, which may strengthen the hopes for some form of eventual Union.

Believing in the freedom of the press, this journal represents a forum where articles containing many different, and often controversial opinions are being published. They do not necessarily express the views or policy of the paper.

INDIA'S "NEAR-PAKISTAN"

by Boris Heiseler

EVEN before the memorable discussion between Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Gandhi on May 6th, when the deadlock between the two leaders was proved beyond hope, Lord Ismay left Delhi for London to report to the British Government. At the same hour when the two Indian protagonists were having their last discussion, he met members of the Cabinet and high officials of the India Office and unfolded before them the new draft partition plan for India. He was soon followed by the Viceroy himself, who flew to London in order to participate in the discussions. The Cabinet's decisions on how the division of that country is to be carried out is awaited, and may probably be announced before this article appears in print.

The information available on the "Mountbatten Plan," as it is now being called, points at two things: Firstly, that Muslims are being pacified with offers of partition and independence. Secondly, that their Pakistan aims are not fully met. To put it into a formula: The solution proposed is not Pakistan, but near-Pakistan.

It is hoped that Mr. Jinnah, whose obstinacy wrecked the British Labour Government's most recent efforts to set India free, will be more accommodating this time. Unfortunately, there are already signs that his unco-operative attitude has not changed and is reflected in the demands voiced by League spokesmen. The Muslim good will, it appears, can be obtained only at the cost of accepting the Pakistan principle, agreeing to indivisibility of provinces and the realisation of the claim to areas with over 70 per cent. Muslim population. The League would like to see State-assisted exchange of populations, Muslims from the United Provinces, Bihar, Bombay, and Madras; and Hindus from the Punjab and Bengal. Muslims say that they would be prepared to give the three million Sikhs of the Punjab a wide measure of "cultural" autonomy. Whether this is a tempting proposition to the Sikhs is doubtful. It certainly is not to Master Tara Singh, who made recently the following public statement: "We (Sikhs—Ed.) shall live or die but not submit to Muslim domination."

Whether the partition scheme for India is approved and finally applied in its present or modified form will, therefore, very largely depend on the League's ability to show greater flexibility of mind and will to compromise than it has shown in the past. It must not, however, be blamed for all failures and its own difficulties must not be underestimated. For this purpose it is proposed to enumerate here the more valid arguments in favour of Pakistan, the Muslim aspiration inspired by Jinnah and preached by his supporters. This is what they say:

There are about 100 million Muslims in India, and it is only fair that they should be permitted to set up a national home of their own. It should comprise the predominantly Muslim areas of Punjab, North-West Frontier, Sind, Baluchistan, Bengal and Assam. (Pakistan

stands for:—**P** for Punjab; **A** for Afghanistan and Assam; **K** for Kashmir; **S** for Sind; and **Stan** for Baluchistan and Bangistan, the latter being a popular name for Bengal.) The League does not object to the formation of a sovereign Hindu State, Hindustan, which could embrace all the Hindu lands, namely the provinces of Bihar, Orissa, United Provinces, Madras, Central Provinces and Bombay. Muslims, the League says, are a separate nation having nothing in common with Hindus in language, culture, religion and their whole mode of life, and this gulf had been further widened by religious rivalries and bloodshed. Pakistan, Muslims say, would leave three-fourths of India to the Hindus, and the establishment of the Muslim State would prevent the domination of the smaller nation by the bigger nation.

In partitioned India, Pakistan partisans declare, their State would be still one of the largest countries in the world, with an area of 348,339 square miles and a population of 59,101,207 (Muslims alone). Pakistan would be in a position to grow more wheat, rice, tea and jute than it would require for its own needs, and would be rich in mineral resources, water power and timber. It would possess canals and excellent ports. Arrangements could be arrived at between sovereign Pakistan and Hindustan on questions of defence, communications, customs, currency and minorities. The last but not the least important Muslim League claim in favour of Pakistan is that Pakistan would bring salvation to 60 million of India's "untouchables."

Nobody will dispute the fact that the Muslim arguments have something in their favour. What one does object to is the rigidity and inflexibility which the Muslim League has so far displayed. However forceful the Muslim argument, one cannot avoid asking oneself a number of questions which only future developments can answer. Would a solution approximating Pakistan, but for some practical reasons known to technical experts, just short of it, satisfy Mr. Jinnah? Or will such a turn of events immediately cause a breakdown of negotiations and the withdrawal of Muslims from the scene? What will the reactions to the partition plan be of the rank and file supporters of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru? Are Hindus going to co-operate?

If the Government could enlist both Muslim and Hindu good will, a partitioned India may yet prove to be a blessing, where a united India was condemned to utter failure. How most regrettable it is that Britain's genuine and generous offer of freedom and independence to India has been refused by the Indian in the first place because they still have not learned to be united. Now the gift is again placed in their hands, this time altered to suit their somewhat outmoded requirements—for a united, free India would, of course, have been a more advanced creation than the contemplated partition of the country. It is paradoxical that a retrogressive step should, perhaps, lead to more rapid progress.

THE CASTE SYSTEM IN INDIA

by A Special Correspondent recently in India

WHEN the British leave India there will be sixty million Indians at least who will bitterly regret their going, and who now look with terror on their future. These are the sixty million outcasts, the Untouchables, who pollute the very air which a caste Hindu breathes. They may not take water from the village well, because no Hindu could drink after them; their children would soil and disgrace the children of caste Hindus if they went to the same school; their very shadows cast on a Hindu's food will contaminate it and make it uneatable. Some are regarded as being so filthy that they contaminate not only by touch or by their shadows but by merely existing within a distance of 64 ft. of a caste Hindu, and these wretches must warn any high caste Hindu in case he approaches within the forbidden distance and so becomes polluted by them, as the lepers in the Middle Ages in Europe used to go through the streets crying "unclean" to prevent others being infected by their disease.

But it is not disease which makes these sixty million outcasts in India a menace to their fellow-men. It is the mere fact that they have not been born into one of the Hindu castes. Outcasts they are born, and outcasts they will die, for there is no hope whatever of their rising by any effort from their miserable state. Or rather, there was no hope until the British came to India. Under the British their lot has greatly improved; schools and hospitals have been opened to them; thousands of them have become converted to Christianity, which by teaching them that God cares for all men, has given them new hope and self-respect; many, through education, have risen to great positions, as did Dr. Ambedkar, one of their leaders, who became a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, the highest office an Indian could hold. They now fear that when the British have gone, the fetters of their ancient misery will be fastened on them more firmly by the Hindu rulers of the country.

How did this terrible system arise? Because the Brahmins, who are the hereditary priests of the Hindu religion, are the highest caste in the system, it is often thought that the caste system is part of the Hindu religion. It is not. It is a social organisation of society by which people are graded by their occupation.

Originally in India there were four castes which correspond to similar castes in mediaeval Europe—the Brahmins, who were the priests, law givers and intellectuals; the Kshatriyas, who were the warriors; the Vaisyas, who were the merchants and yeomen; and the Sudras, who carried on all the other trades—labourers, leather workers, tinsmiths, and so on. In time the four castes multiplied into sub-castes, and no one knows exactly how many there are to-day—there are probably between three and four thousand, all graded carefully in the social scale by occupation, stretching from the highest to the lowest. No one who belongs to one of these castes may raise himself to

a higher, nor is there any inter-marriage between them. The results appear to us to be ludicrous. A leather worker, for instance, is in a particularly low caste, and the owner of a boot factory, however wealthy or worthy, would not be able to marry the daughter of a grocer. A man of a high caste, although he will cheerfully live in the same room as a cow (an animal sacred to Hindus) will not accept a drink of water from a man in a lower caste. Dinner for a Brahmin, the highest caste, is an elaborate and somewhat perilous undertaking. If the shadow of a man in a lower caste falls on his food he must throw it all away. He must not touch leather or a dog or a donkey or a child before he eats for he will either have to go hungry or undergo a tedious ceremony of purification. He may not even read a book with his dinner, since printer's ink is impure and would contaminate the food. So it is uphill work being a Brahmin.

Completely outside of the system come the so-called depressed classes or outcasts, who are descended from the dark-skinned races who originally inhabited India, called Dravidians, who were conquered by the fair-skinned Aryans. The conquerors, to maintain the purity of their race, imposed a ruthless colour bar and forbade any marriage or intercourse between the two races. They also employed the conquered people as slaves, and prohibited them from doing anything except the most menial work which was too degrading for the fair-skinned conquerors to do, and so they became scavengers, prostitutes, removers of carcases and sweepers of filth. The descendants of these people are still doing this sort of work, and although their fair-skinned conquerors were themselves conquered first by the Moslems and then by the British, they are still, after thousands of years, in practically the same condition of slavery and degradation, excluded as pariahs from the rest of Hindu society.

We may wonder how such an unwieldy and tyrannous system can have become so firmly established amongst so many million people and, what is more, accepted by them. There are two main reasons for this. The first is the Hindu religion. The caste system is not a religious system, but it could never have come to exist or be accepted except by people who held the beliefs of the Hindus. The Hindus believe that we do not have one life but many, and that we are born in good or bad circumstances in accordance with the way that we have behaved in previous lives. If a cleaner of lavatories does his work well and leads a virtuous life then in his next life he may be a Maharajah or even a Brahmin, and if a Maharajah leads a wicked life, then in his next existence he may be cleaning lavatories, or worse still, grunting about as a pig, or he may even be a flea or a bluebottle.

This belief tends to make a man accept with resignation a lowly position in the scale of castes, since he reflects that next time he may be better off, and that anyway it is

no good complaining since his present degraded position is probably due to his misbehaviour in a previous life. The other factor which tends to keep the caste system going is that it is very useful, particularly to the rich and powerful. For thousands of years it has kept Hindu society stable. It makes the poor man contented with his lot, not striving anxiously to rise and not envious of the riches of others. It has been a bulwark against revolution and change, and has kept Hindu society in practically the same condition as it was thousands of years ago.

Apart from the oppression of the outcasts, the caste system has other bad effects. One of the worst is that it has tended to weaken the Hindu character. The Hindu is a fatalist, and although that gives him a certain serenity and makes him look with contempt on what he regards as the envy and materialistic outlook of Western people,

at the same time it makes him look on all effort as worthless. "Why bother?" he says, and sits contented amongst filth and squalor and cruelty, and does nothing to change them.

The rule of the British in India has done much to break the system down. Laws have been passed to protect the outcasts, although it is hard to enforce them against the ancient prejudices of the caste Hindus. One of the severest blows at the system has been the great railway system which the British introduced. On a long train journey it is impossible for the strict caste rules about the preparation and eating of food to be completely observed, and in a crowded railway carriage all sorts and conditions of men are forced into contact with each other whether they like it or not, and whatever the rules of caste may say.

AFGHANISTAN

The Country and its Early History

by Lt-Col. Sir Kerr Fraser-Tytlar, K.B.E., C.M.G., M.C.

IN 1919 Afghanistan emerged from under the shadow of British suzerainty into the limelight of international affairs, as a fully fledged sovereign State. Since that date its Government has undergone some vicissitudes of fortune and the country has experienced one serious revolution. For the last eighteen years, however, it has been making steady, if slow, progress, and were the affairs of Central and Southern Asia to continue in the state of equilibrium established forty years ago, the Afghan people and Government might well look forward to an era of peace and security which would enable them to develop their resources and stabilise their economy. It is still possible that this will be the case.

It is at any rate interesting to note that throughout the long series of debates, negotiations and conferences which, since 1917, have marked the transfer of authority in India from British to Indian hands, little or no attention has been directed to the effect likely to be produced on the stability and policy of India's neighbours by the partial or total withdrawal of British prestige and influence from Southern Asia. For 30 years the best brains in Britain and India have studied and discussed India's future, but while immense consideration has been given to the effect of the withdrawal of British sovereignty on the balance of power within India, little has been said about the effect of such withdrawal on her external relationships. The problem of India's future has been considered, as it were, in a vacuum.

And yet a study of the past will show that throughout recorded history the country we now call Afghanistan has been intimately connected with social and political develop-

ments in India. For close on 800 years, foreign conquerors from the North sat on the throne of Delhi. In the 15th century the southern territories of Afghanistan were known as India the Less, for the next 200 years Afghanistan formed part of the Moghul Empire, and again and again in the history of the earlier Empires do we find that the boundaries of India were not the river Indus nor the low hills of the present frontier, but stretched right up to and beyond the high ridges of the Hindu Kush, the Great Divide between Central and Southern Asia.

In writing of Afghanistan as it is to-day, at the moment when so great a transfer of sovereignty is taking place in Asia, I cannot separate it from its environment and treat it as India has been treated without reference to its past history or to its external relationships. I propose, therefore, in the first of this series of articles to give a brief description of the country, and then to glance backward at the story of the early Empires before going on to describe the rise of Afghan power in the 18th century and its evolution from that time onwards to the present day.

The dominating feature of Afghanistan is the mountain range of the Hindu Kush which, after forming the Indo-Afghan boundary between the Killik and Mandal Passes on the Chitral border, turns westward and crosses the country in a series of lofty ridges and deep-set valleys with projecting spurs running out to North and South. Opposite Kabul and about 100 miles to the North, the main ridge is from 15 to 20 thousand feet high. It continues westward under varying names and at an ever diminishing height until it runs out into the valley of the Hari Rud along the low ridges of the Parapomus Mountains. Round the

bases of this range lie the valleys and the plateaus of Afghanistan, bounded on the North by the river Oxus and the Kara Kum sands, on the East and South by what is known as the Durand line along the hills of the North-West Frontier of India, and in the West by the Persian desert and the valley of the Hari Rud.

Within these boundaries the country, whose area is approximately 250,000 square miles, may be roughly divided into four parts, corresponding to the four main river systems. In the North are the broad plains of the Oxus valley, which only require a planned irrigation system to make them as fertile as they once were when Balkh was a great city and Bactria a well-populated land. In the West is the valley of the Hari Rud in which lies Herat, once the capital of Shah Rukh, son of Timur-i-Lang, when it was a seat of learning and culture renowned throughout Asia. In the South is the valley of the Helmand and the desert country stretching away past the old ruined Sasanid cities to the frontiers of Persia. But before the Helmand reaches the desert it flows through a rich country round Qandahar, more famous nowadays, perhaps, for its melons and other fruits than for the many times this outer bastion of North-Western India has changed hands in past history. And lastly some three hundred miles North of Qandahar and across the high ground by Ghazni, where once Mahmud held his court embellished with the spoils of Hindu India, lies the Indus watershed and the Kabul river with its many tributaries. The Kabul plateau on which the capital stands is nearly 6,000 feet above sea level, a well-watered fertile plain surrounded by hills with the river running through it on its journey down to the plain of Jalalabad and the valley of the Indus. The Kabul area, in which is to be found the outline of the ancient capital Kapisa (Begram), has often in the past been the springboard for invasion of northern India.

This, then, in brief description, is the country of the Afghans, the glaxis of the Hindu Kush. It is a very beautiful country of fertile valleys and wide, barren plateaus, of sharp spurs and deep gorges where the grey-green rivers come tumbling down from their sources in the snow-filled corries, and the brown rocks above turn golden and mauve and blue in the light of the evening sun. It is a country of extremes, where on the Kabul plateau the thermometer has a yearly range from zero to 100 degrees Fahrenheit, and in the low-lying valleys of the Oxus and the lower Helmand 120 deg. F. is a normal summer temperature. It is a very dry country where no rain falls from May to December, while the shepherds follow the seasonal grazing from the plains right up into the high valleys, and the fertility of the soil depends on irrigation.

But it is, above all, a country of great historical interest. The Mountains of the Hindu Kush, projecting westward from the Pamirs, have throughout historical times guarded the approaches to India from the North. They have formed a breakwater to direct the great stream of migration from further Asia westwards into the Middle East, or to break the force of invasion southwards into India. This breakwater was sufficient to guard India from the full force of the Arab invasions of Central Asia in the 7th century A.D., and from the more devastating Mongol

cataclysm which passed through Asia into Europe in the 13th century.

Where, on the other hand, the invaders have turned directly southwards across the Oxus we find that a more or less regular cycle emerges. From the time of Alexander (328 B.C.) onwards, invading peoples have taken possession of the rich lands which lie between the Oxus and the mountains. A pause for consolidation follows, and then these hardy northerners pour across the Hindu Kush and drive forwards to the conquest of Northern and Central India. Once established in India the focus of interest and of sovereignty moves southwards, the North is neglected, and the fissiparous action of the great mountain barrier causes the northern territories to break away and fall victim to some fresh inrush of conquerors, while the southern overlords in time degenerate under the enervating effect of a tropical climate and merge into the body politic of India.

While these great cycles of Central Asian history were in progress, the Afghans appear to have remained an obscure and lawless tribe inhabiting the tangled country of mountain and ravine round the Koh-i-Suleiman in what is now South Waziristan on the Indian Frontier. They, themselves, claim to be of Jewish origin, the Beni-Israel, but it seems more probable that they are of Iranian type, and that on the original stock has been superimposed elements of Turkish, Mongol and other strains which have at different times infiltrated into or through what is now the Indo-Afghan border. Their language, Pashtu, belongs to the Aryan sub-division of the Indo-European group of languages.

The name Afghan, though of unknown origin, first appears in the Hadud-al-Alam, a work by an unknown Arab geographer who wrote c. 982 A.D. References to the Afghans crop up at intervals in the early histories, but the Afghan tribes do not appear to have been of much account until in the 14th century they began to spread across the southern areas of the country to which they were destined to give their name. During the Moghul period they were growing in strength; Babur, founder of the Moghul Empire, considered it expedient to contract an alliance by marriage with one of the leading tribes, the Yusufzais, and Aurungzeb, last of the great Moghul Emperors, had to contend in 1672 with a serious rebellion among the Afridis of the Khyber and the tribes further to the West, which lasted for three years. The Afghans were beginning to find their feet, and to show the first signs of that passionate hatred of foreign domination which developed into one of their most marked characteristics.

Some 75 years later their opportunity came. An Afghan contingent, consisting mainly of the Abdali or Durrani tribe, formed the personal bodyguard of Nadir Shah, ruler of Persia, under a leader Ahmad Shah, chief of the Sadozai section. When in 1747 the Shah was assassinated by his own officers in his camp at Khabushan in East Persia, the Afghan bodyguard, greatly outnumbered by the Persians, fought their way out of the camp, and reached Qandahar. Here a few days later Ahmad Shah Durrani was proclaimed first King of the Afghans.

(To be continued.)

THE MINORITY PROBLEM IN BURMA

by Lt.-Col. J. Cromarty-Tulloch, D.S.O.

We realise this article represents a point of view which may raise many controversies, and have, therefore, arranged with Lt.-Col. D. R. Rees-Williams, M.P., Chairman of the Frontier Areas Commission of Enquiry, who has just returned from Burma, to publish his views on the subject in our next issue.

NOWHERE in the world, possibly, is the essential difference between Hillmen and Plainsmen more sharply defined than in Burma. Not only is the fundamental clash of temperament between highlander and lowlander sharpened by racial, cultural and ideological instincts, but the Burmese of the plains have, rightly or wrongly, acquired from the past a reputation for chicanery which, in the opinion of the Hillpeople, has been projected into the present. In other words: they do not trust the Burmese an inch.

It seems, on the face of it, a great pity that we should have chosen, both in India and Burma, to interpret "self-determination" in terms of economics rather than of history and geography. The Government's decision to leave India next year, even if it means handing over to denominational rather than central policy, is a tacit admission of the failure of that policy, and it requires no great measure of acumen to foresee a similar outcome in Burma. We seem to have forgotten that the Burma of to-day—like India—is an artificial entity held together by the cement of British rule, an entity which will tend to disintegrate into its component parts once that cement is removed. Even supposing the economic factors which influenced our policy to be sound, might it not still have been better to grant these components their individual liberty in the hope that circumstances—i.e., economics—would bring them together than to leave "self-determination" to be administered by a majority racial element? At the best they can now only cement Burma by applying majority racial rule instead of British rule—and everyone who has been in the East knows what that means.

A number of reasons have been put forward to prove that the Government's policy was the only possible solution for Burma; but, I take leave to challenge two of them here—that the communal question does not arise in Burma, and that the minorities are too small to merit separate consideration.

Burma is inhabited primarily by Burmese, Karens, Shans, Kachins and Arakanese. There are other races—Mon, Talaing, Touththoo—who have not been given primary status because they have tended to become absorbed in the general population; but the others are distinct, virile people, speaking their own languages and occupying their own well-defined and exclusive areas. Thus, the Burmese inhabit the rich central plain of the Irrawaddy while the vast semi-circle of densely wooded mountains which surrounds it, equally rich in potential, is peopled entirely by Karens, Shans, Kachins and Chins. If the lumping together of all this wide diversity of race, religion and antecedent does not constitute a communal problem it would be interesting to know what does.

On the second issue, that of relative population, one must keep an open mind. What constitutes an "insignificant minority"? The figures, taken from the official British Census of 1931, give the following approximate racial allocations out of a grand total of 17 millions.

Shans	2 millions
Karens	1½ millions
Kachins	½ million
Chins	½ million

It must be remembered that the census took place when Burmese national aspirations were emerging in a concrete form, and also that, while it was conducted in all good faith by the Government, 95 per cent. of the actual enumerators were Burmese. The figures were hotly challenged at the time by the Karens, the politically and socially advanced of the Hillpeople, and categorical accusations levelled against the Burmese enumerators. For example, they said that the question unfailingly put was not "What are you—Burmese, Karen, etc.?" but "Are you a Burmese?" On the face of it there seems little to choose but the term actually employed "*Ba-ada Boo-dha?*" can mean either "Are you a Burmese?" or "*Are you a Buddhist?*" As the Karens are two-thirds Buddhist, one-third Christian with a fair sprinkling of Animists and an imperfect knowledge of the finer shades of Burmese language, it was claimed that they were tricked into the wrong answer and deprived of two-thirds of their numbers, which went to swell the Burmese total.

This almost comes into the category of "Cock and Bull Stories," as it was treated by the Government of Burma, but for one significant fact. During the Japanese occupation when the question of political representation was brought up, the Karens again raised the issue with a result that the Japanese military authorities had a special census made, which raised the Karen total to nearly 3½ millions. Anyone familiar with the Japs' meticulous attention to detail will have no hesitation in accepting this figure—and with it the whole extraordinary tale—the more so if he knows that there are almost exactly one million Karen Christians. A strictly impartial enumeration of the whole of Burma might disclose some startling figures.

The sands are running out in Burma. Behind the smooth facade of censored news reaching this country, Hillmen and Plainsmen are girding their loins for battle. And in the ensuing civil war majorities and minorities will go by the board, with economics and chicanery and everything else. And he would be a brave man indeed who would prophesy that the next census will discover even 10 million Burmese or seven million Hillmen.

WHITHER BURMA?

by T. L. Hughes, C.B.E., I.C.S., (retd.)

NEWS from the pleasant land of Burma tends to be crowded out of our present-day newspapers. For the purposes of this article, it is unnecessary to pursue the reasons for this; the fact remains that unless one has access to sources of information not available to the ordinary public, news about Burma is difficult to come by. And yet there must be thousands of men who fought and sweated with Alexander, with Wingate and with Slim who retain warm memories of the colourful Burmese countryside and its cheerful people. It is primarily to them that this article is addressed.

When in May 1942, General (now Field-Marshal) Alexander crossed the Indo-Burma frontier at Tamu with the battered remnants of his army, he left the Japanese in undisputed possession of the major part of Burma. But not by any means the whole of it. You will recollect that Burma on the map is not unlike a kite with a long tail attached. The country at the top end of the kite is inhabited by Chins and Kachins, two warlike tribes who never wavered in their loyalty to us and who for three long years kept the Jap at bay in their hills. Together with their brother tribesmen the Karens, they kept alive the spirit of resistance during the absence of the British. They harassed the enemy's lines of communication whenever he dared set foot in tribal territory, and they gave invaluable help to the Wingate expedition during that epic penetration into the heart of the enemy country. One day the magnificent exploits of these tribesmen will be told, and, believe me, they will make exciting reading.

Three years after General Alexander had evacuated his forces, the 14th Army under the command of General Slim followed up a masterly combined offensive and re-entered Rangoon, having recovered Burma the "hard way," that is, overland from India.

When, in October, 1945, the Governor resumed responsibility for the administration of Burma, he and his officers were faced with well-nigh insuperable difficulties. Offices and houses had for the most part been destroyed. There were practically no records, no libraries, no furniture and no equipment. And transport arrangements were of the sketchiest. Since that time, there has been considerable improvement, but offices are still working under the most primitive and discouraging conditions.

One of the biggest headaches facing the Government now, is the wave of crime sweeping the country. Armed robbery and murder are just about ten times greater than normal. When we returned to Burma we found some 50,000 firearms in the hands of unauthorised persons. For this embarrassing little legacy we must blame first the Jap, and, to a lesser extent, our resistance organisations working underground in enemy country. Over 40,000 weapons and nearly a million rounds of ammunition have been recovered, but there are still far too many weapons in the hands of the gangsters. Many of them are better armed than the police. They terrorise the countryside so that information is hard to obtain. They hold up buses, wreck trains, and are not

averse from attacking police stations. Loyal headmen and sympathisers with the Government are frequently murdered. You will be able to estimate the numbers who have taken to this form of profitable sport when I tell you that there are not less than 20,000 dacoits in prison. In addition, the number killed in encounters with our police and military forces cannot be less than 1,000.

There is a truly monumental task ahead of the Administration in Burma, and what has been accomplished to date is but a tithe of what remains to be done. There have been heart-breaking difficulties and frustrations; supplies have been inadequate in volume; communications have still a long way to go before they touch the pre-war standard; the physical reconstruction of devastated towns has made no progress except on a mat and thatch basis.

On the political front, the last few months have been notable for the agreement reached between His Majesty's Government and a delegation of Burmese Executive Councillors, whereby the future of Burma has been committed to Burmese hands. This agreement provides that the elections held in Burma in April of this year determined the composition of a Constituent Assembly rather than a Legislature as visualised under the 1935 Government of Burma Act, and that the primary task of the Assembly will be the framing of a new constitution for Burma. In the transitional period, the Governor's Executive Council will constitute the Government of Burma, and, by convention, will enjoy the same powers as the interim Government of India; in other words, they will to all intents and purposes exercise autonomous powers. Whether or not Burma remains within the British Commonwealth of Nations is for decision by the Burmese people themselves.

Nor has the very delicate subject of the future of the hill peoples—those Karens, Kachins, Chins, etc., who have deserved so well of us—been overlooked. Provision has been made for the setting up of a Committee of Enquiry to work out the best method of associating all the peoples of Burma in the future Constitution; and, in fact, considerable headway towards agreement appears to have been made at the recent Panglong Conference in the Shan States.*

If this be so, the delegate members of the Executive Council must be congratulated on the success of their mission, which has, indeed, secured for them all they could have desired.

The present Executive Council is composed predominantly of members of the A.F.P.F.L. (Anti-Fascist Peoples' Freedom League), and the recent elections have given a mandate to this same party. In spite of their apparent walk-over, however, it would be unwise to assume that Burmese political opinion is accurately represented by the figures of returned candidates. In the first place, A.F.P.F.L. was faced with no competition at all in roughly half the

* This problem forms the subject of the article on page 8, and will also be dealt with in our next issue by the Chairman of the Committee of Enquiry.

constituencies, and with opposition by and large from one party only—the Communists—in the remainder. What happened to the other parties?: the Myochits, led by ex-Premier and alleged Japanese collaborator U Saw; the Mahabama under Dr. Ba Maw, head of the puppet Government installed by the Japanese; or the Dobama Asiayone headed by that zealous young revolutionary Thakin Ba Sein? What was behind their boycott of the elections? It was certainly not dislike of electioneering: indeed, the Burman regards an election as on much the same level of entertainment as his national theatrical performance, the *pwe*. Why then were A.F.P.F.L. candidates faced with such remarkably little opposition? Regrettable though the conclusion must be to those who have consistently planted the seed of democratic freedom in the Asiatic mind, there is good reason to believe that the election was “phoney.” To appreciate why this was so, we must first review the history of A.F.P.F.L. and its remarkable young President, U Aung San.

First prominent as a leader of the Rangoon University students' strike in 1936, U Aung San more than once saw the inside of His Majesty's prisons, and was regarded as a political fire-brand professing anti-British sympathies. Escaping the eye of the Burma police, he went underground in 1941 and reappeared in Japan, where he underwent military training with a Japanese formation. When the Japanese invaded Burma in 1941-42, Aung San was with them and was given the task of creating the Burma Independence Army, an organisation which assisted the Japs to drive the British out. For his services, he was given the Japanese rank of Major-General and later became Defence Minister in the Ba Maw puppet Government.

Though deluded temporarily by the Japanese offer of “independence” for Burma, it was not long before U Aung San and others with him realised they had been duped by “Co-prosperity sphere” propaganda, and negotiations were opened with members of Allied resistance movements working inside Japanese occupied territory. Eventually, with the 14th Army as far as Meiktila on their irresistible advance southwards, U Aung San and his Burmese Army threw off the Japanese yoke and did considerable execution among their late masters. Simultaneously, a civilian resistance movement came into being called the Anti-Fascist Organisation, later to be known as the Anti-Fascist Peoples' Freedom League. It had for its object the expulsion of the Japanese from Burma, and, such was the love of the Burmese people for these sons of Nippon, people of all political faiths were attracted to it.

The end of the war did not, however, see the dissolution of A.F.P.F.L.; rather did the League under the

leadership of U Aung San and the persuasiveness of his ex-comrades-in-arms consolidate its position as the most influential and powerful party in the country. Attempts to undermine the League's strength by the traditional Burmese method of party fragmentation have met with little success, and it is true to say that the League has never enjoyed such prestige as it does to-day. For this result, credit should go primarily to U Aung San, who has increased recently in stature and statesmanship, and whose stock never stood higher.

But let us not overlook the part played by his ex-comrades-in-arms, who are now organised into a private army of some fifteen thousand strong, ready to use the very toughest methods against those voicing views contrary to A.F.P.F.L. ideology. It is from their ranks that most of the A.F.P.F.L. candidates were drawn, and there is good reason to believe that effective steps were taken to warn rival candidates off the course. It is, for example, an open secret that U Saw, leader of the strongest pre-war party, entertains the liveliest fears for his own safety should he set himself up in opposition to U Aung San. Since one bare-faced attempt has already been made to assassinate U Saw, his fears may be considered not without foundation. And other political leaders cannot fail to be impressed by this thoroughly undemocratic deterrent to the expression of rival political views.

Well, the elections have come and gone, peacefully and uneventfully. To A.F.P.F.L. and U Aung San will now fall the truly formidable task of devising a new constitution for greater Burma, and for conducting with His Majesty's Government the negotiations determining the future relationship between Britain and Burma. These will be tasks demanding all the sagacity and statesmanship of which Burma's political leaders are capable. But at least it will be a task far less formidable than that facing Pandit Nehru and his fellow-countrymen across the Bay of Bengal. And I venture to express the opinion that when the time comes for the final choice to be made, much of the current urge for complete independence will give way to a more realistic appreciation of the material advantages inherent in partnership in the British Commonwealth. Sandwiched in as she is between the teeming millions of an unhappily-divided China on the one hand, and an ultra-nationalistic India on the other, an entirely independent Burma would lie uneasy in her bed. No Burmese statesman with the security of his country at heart can afford to overlook the advantages of having a powerful friend at court, and what better friend for Burma than Britain, with whom she has been in happy cultural and economic association for so many years?

BURMA FRONTIER REPORT.

The report presented by the Burma Frontier Areas Committee of Inquiry, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Rees-Williams, M.P., has now been accepted by His Majesty's Government and by the Burma Government. The way, therefore, seems plain sailing to the

Constituent Assembly. This unanimous report, which presupposes a great measure of agreement among the people concerned, is a cause of great relief among those interested in Burma. The frontier areas are not, as they were described in the House of Lords, “An edge”; they represent some 47 per cent. of the total area of the country. Their

tribes are as varying stages of development from the primitive Was, who have just removed 47 heads, right up to the Shan States where there is a considerable measure of local autonomy. It is most satisfactory that in a country the size of Germany, populated by so many and diverse races, an agreed solution appears to have been arrived at.

BRITAIN AND CHINA

by W. N. Warbey, M.P.

Mr. Warbey is here answering questions put to him by Mr. Daniel Lee, the London correspondent of *Takungpao* (The Impartial), prominent Chinese newspaper which appears daily in Chungking, Shanghai, Tientsin and Hong Kong.

It seems that there is a section of public opinion in Britain which suggests that Britain, America and the Soviet Union may succeed in mediating civil strife in China after the American failure. They believe Three-Power mediation may succeed where General Marshall failed. Do you share their views?

I certainly believe that joint mediation of the three Powers might help in moderating the civil strife in China. Such mediation would, however, not be possible until there has been a general settlement of the at present conflicting interests of the three powers in the Far East. Such a settlement can only come about through the general easing of the international political tension. I should like think that Britain could exercise a mediating role as between the opposing interests of the U.S. and Soviet Union, but this can only be achieved if Britain is able to pursue a more vigorous and independent foreign policy than has been possible during the past twenty months. I believe that one of the important by-products of increased Anglo-Chinese friendship would be the strengthening of Britain's position as a mediator in the Far East.

China and Britain are negotiating a commercial treaty. Business firms in Britain are very keen that the treaty should grant them shipping rights along the China Coast and also the Yangtze River. Chinese people, especially the shipping companies, however, are firmly opposed to this suggestion on the grounds of national sovereignty. It seems that this is one of the greatest issues involved in the new treaty. Are you in favour of British shipping rights along the China Coast?

I sincerely hope that the present negotiations for an Anglo-Chinese commercial treaty will meet with success. I am, however, strongly opposed to the granting of any special rights to British shipping which would conflict with Chinese national sovereignty. The day for special privileges and extra-territorial rights is long past.

I understand a British Parliamentary Mission might pay a visit to China in the coming Autumn. Suppose you were already in China now; what would be the first three things you would like to know?

If I were in China now, the first three things I would like to know would be: (1) What are the prospects of a central Chinese Government on a fully democratic basis with participation of all political parties which are loyal to China and to the aims of UNO; (2) What efforts are being made by the Government to modernise Chinese agriculture and industry, and from what sources does China hope to obtain the necessary capital investment; (3) What is the present standard of living of the Chinese people and, in this

connection, why has China put forward such low claims to international relief following the termination of the activities of UNRRA.*

Are you satisfied with the British Government's present policy towards China? What might be done to promote further Anglo-Chinese friendship and remove misunderstanding?

I believe that Anglo-Chinese friendship can be promoted by a more vigorous British policy in the Far East. There has been a tendency to leave Far Eastern affairs too much to the Americans and to accept a passive British role in this region. Future British activity in the Far East cannot any longer be based on great military strength, but must be based upon the active promotion of closer commercial and cultural relations between the British and Chinese people. The exchange of visits between parliamentary delegations, trade missions and educationalists should be strongly encouraged.

Do you agree that in principle Britain should return Hong Kong to China? If so, under what circumstances should the return be made?

I am in favour of the return of Hong Kong to China with the provision that the strategic bases should be placed at the disposal of the UNO Security Council and manned by a UNO international armed force. I may say that I am in favour of a similar method of dealing with Gibraltar and Malta, and other territories of strategic value occupied by one or other of the Great Powers.

International understanding relies to a large extent upon knowing each other. From this point of view, as a newspaperman, I think the British Press is not giving adequate coverage to the Far East. It is true to a certain extent, that the high cable charges are one of the reasons handicapping news reporting from China. But there are certain news agencies' reports like those of Reuters, United Press and Associated Press which could be more fully used by the British Press to inform the British public about the Far Eastern situation. The American abandonment of mediation efforts in China, for example, was news of international significance, yet not more than three papers in London published the news.

I certainly think that the British Press should give more coverage to Chinese and other Far Eastern news. It is most important that the British people should learn to think of the world as a whole and not become merely British- or even merely European-minded.

* Report of the UNO special Technical Committee on post-UNRRA Relief.

EDUCATION IN CHINA

from our U.N.E.S.C.O. Correspondent

CHINA'S war of resistance against Japan started in 1931 with the seizure of the North-Eastern Three Provinces by the invading Japanese Army, although the actual declaration of hostilities took place in 1937. Since the very beginning, Chinese universities and schools had been the targets of enemy destruction. The Japanese had long before realised that China, being a vast country composed mainly of illiterate peasant population, could not carry on the fighting without intellectual leadership; and therefore the annihilation of institutes of learning and of the educational personnel was of as great value to them as capture of important cities. This, indeed, had been a part of Japanese strategy. The conservative estimate of damage done in this field amounts to seven hundred million American dollars, while the loss of lives of teachers and students is beyond calculation as the territory occupied by the Japanese has been so large and the period of occupation so long.

Like the Japanese, the Chinese Government did not fail to realise the importance of education in the war. As a matter of fact, from the very outset of hostilities, education has had double significance for the Chinese people. First, it became a vital part of the strategy for the protracted warfare. The reinforcement of technicians and intelligent administrative staff was considered as indispensable as that of troops. Second, the war has been regarded as a form of revolution, which wipes out the things that are old, out of date, and which paves the way for reformation, and for the creation of a new democracy after the war. This task alone cannot be accomplished without a large number of intellectuals to work for the people as teachers and civil servants and engineers. Thus, in spite of the destruction of the already existing schools and in spite of the various difficulties, chiefly in finance and transport, that prevented the establishment of new schools, the authorities had not for a single minute relaxed the effort for higher as well as mass education.

A glance at the following table will reveal that the number of schools had not diminished, but enormously increased in the course of war. It is to be stressed here that they are not all new schools, nor were they all established in Free China. Quite a number of them were situated behind Japanese lines.

	Universities	Students	Secondary Schools	Pupils
1936 ...	108	41,922	2,716	544,061
1944 ...	—	—	3,745	1,163,113
1945 ...	—	80,646	—	—
1946 ...	141	—	—	—
Increase ...	33%	92%	38%	114%

It is no easy task to achieve such results, especially as China was then fighting alone and was tightly blockaded by the Japanese from receiving even such harmless equipment as a microscope from friendly institutes abroad. The difficulties of setting up a new school were beyond description in those miserable days. But the removal of the universities from the war area to the mountains in the rear is by no means a less heroic episode. As the war progressed and spread farther into the interior, a school sometimes had to be moved half a dozen times. And owing to the comparative primitiveness of the mountainous regions both professors and students had to travel on foot, sparing animals to carry the little equipment and books saved from Japanese bombing. Again, as the progress was thus made slow, lectures had to be carried out in roadside shelters or in mountain caves so as to avoid serious interruption of teaching.

Nor is that all. The phenomenal increase of new students and the impoverishment of the old caused by their isolation from their families in the war zones, entailed another serious problem: their upkeep and accommodation. If they were to continue their university work, this could only be done by granting them universal scholarships in the form of emergency loans to be repaid by instalments after they leave the schools and find jobs. This measure the government immediately took without hesitation. Thus the budget for education swelled from \$44,339,962 a year in 1936 to \$107,987,499 a year in 1946. While the loss of port towns and the destruction of industry produced a nationwide cut of revenue, this increase undoubtedly constituted a great financial strain on the Government during the war.

The financial distress, however, was bridged by the utmost determination and endeavour of both the Government and the educational authorities. The most deadly blow was the lack of teaching material, which nearly annulled all the good efforts. The Japanese blockade of the Chinese sea coast and later of the Burma Road, rendered the equipment of laboratories utterly impossible. As there was no remarkable amount of industry in Free China, there existed few available printing presses. Even though there was ample supply of local material for paper, there was no machine to make it. The shortage of books has never been so acute as during the war. It was only by superhuman patience and enthusiasm and hard work that the difficulties were overcome with the primitive method of copying by hand. This extraordinary feat could, of course, have been performed only during the war of resistance, when the desire for survival and independence impelled human beings to do the impossible. It is obvious that as soon as the struggle—and a long struggle at that—came to a satisfactory conclusion, this passion, being exhausted, could no longer be exploited and, therefore, could not serve any practical purpose.

Another difficulty which faced the Chinese educational authorities was the maintenance of the elementary and secondary schools behind the Japanese lines. As the people in the vast coastal provinces, then under Japanese occupation, are much more enterprising than those on the mountains, teaching among them had to be carried on, if not on a larger scale, at least as much as before the war, so that the younger generation suffered no gap in their intellectual development and that, therefore, the nation could have a large administrative staff ready for the post-war reconstruction. Here, the shortage of books (the Japanese banned the issue of the pre-war textbooks) became a less serious problem compared with the clandestine activities of the teaching authorities. To play hide-and-seek with the Japanese inspectors had become almost a daily routine for the Chinese teachers in villages and small towns. It was not a joking matter. Thousands of efficient, patriotic teachers had been sacrificed in the game. And now it is a most difficult task to replace them.

The war went on without interruption for eight solid years. Like the people, education had undergone unprecedented suffering for the same length of time, each succeeding year worse than the former one. To maintain the pre-war level was hard enough, but to raise it requires a miracle indeed. Luckily enough, this miracle did happen. But it was made into a reality not by chance, but by great sacrifice and superhuman endurance of hardship, by pooling together all the available resources, even at the expense of the war. The last year of the war was the hardest year, the topmost peak the sacrifice and endurance of the Chinese could reach. The highest peak of passionate effort cannot be permanently maintained.

But the task lying ahead is by no means minimised for the Chinese educators. On the contrary it has increased a hundredfold. The return of the evacuated schools and universities to the old sites, many of which had been razed to the ground by the Japanese, means virtually the establishment of new institutions of learning. This entails a manifold activity: first, school buildings have to be set up anew and then libraries and laboratories have to be re-equipped. This requires not only an enormously large educational budget, but also materials, which alone constitute a problem almost as serious as during the war, now that the destroyed industry has barely got on its feet yet.

Again, with the publication of the new constitution worked out by the First National Assembly convened in December, 1946, a new democratic China is in sight, where universal suffrage is going to be a practice. This means universal education for all the men and women in the country, so that they can read and write and take active part in the future elections. Indeed, as early as 1929, the Government had outlined a programme for mass education, according to which each village is going to have a school and each school is to have a department for the adult illiterate peasants and their wives as well as for the children. Now that China is marching ahead to be a new democracy, this scheme has to be carried out in the shortest possible time. She is in urgent need not only of millions of village schools, but also of millions of new teachers.

So peace does not really mean peace to the Chinese educators. In a sense it means a bigger war, war against monstrous material shortage, both in the way of books and equipment as well as of funds, and against the lack of teaching personnel, for China, after many years of hard struggle and suffering, is exhausted practically of everything but students.

Dragnet out for Jap "Propheteers"

from our Tokio Correspondent,

John Murdoch

THE Japanese authorities recently launched a clean-up campaign on "prophet healers"—a racket which, officialdom says, has become a thriving business in post-war Japan. One suspect allegedly doing a profitable business was a middle-aged woman named Toki-san, who gave her address as "Palace of Heaven, Nagoya." It seems that this lady had a miraculous remedy for all kinds of ailments, and that gullible "believers" were flocking daily to Nagoya to benefit from her divine "treatment." A disciple of the religion called Akita (a mixture of Bhuddhism and Shintoism), Toki-san's specialty—according to the police—was a "breath cure." She claimed that a mere whiff of her breath would instantly banish sickness from the afflicted, and that a sip of "holy water" from her lungs would immediately alleviate the sufferings of a believer. On the basis that Toki-san was charging 30 yen for each exhalation or sip, the authorities conservatively assessed her earned income at about 2,000 yen a day. Police inquiries also revealed that three believers had died, despite the fact that Toki-san had breathed stertorously on them for some time. Incidentally, it is interesting to recall that towards the close of the late world war, the same Toki-san was in the police bad books for predicting that if Tojo continued to resist, Japan would become "a sea of fire." Her insistence that the "warning" was uttered through her by a "divine power" resulted in her being freed.

Meanwhile, down in Kurusu, a male seer named Miki-san (Grand Miki to his flock) aroused police and public interest when he opened headquarters for a devout organisation called "Perfect Liberty." Almost simultaneously, there were 30 branch offices throughout Japan. They started printing a book of hymns, many of them sung to tunes commonly used in Christian churches.

Grand Miki hopes to get one million converts in about three years' time. Sorrowfully, he recalled that ten years ago he had founded the organisation known as "Hito No Michi" (the human way), but that its one million adherents had been disbanded by the police. At that period, Grand Miki claimed: "Both Christ and Buddha tried to imitate me."

A Japanese police patrol soon picked up another "propheteer"—a genial chap named Kita-san, when he allegedly talked about a national catastrophe to come, which only he could avert. He prophesied, according to police reports, that 90 per cent. of the Japanese nation would be killed off in epidemics which would sweep Japan for some three years, starting in September next. "But, if you are graced by my holy hands, you will survive," he

is reported to have assured the credulous. In jail in Kobe, Kita-san faced two counts—alleged promotion of a national superstition, and, secondly, alleged operation of an illegal medical establishment.

Maybe this is only the beginning of the end, so far as Japan's "propheteers" are concerned. The authorities, I'm assured, are determined, once and for all, to stamp out this nefarious ramp.

NEPAL AND THE BRITISH CONNECTION

by "Bamuniya"

Since this article—written by a high authority on Nepal—has gone to press, it has been announced in Delhi that Nepal has agreed to allow the British and Indian armies to recruit Gurkhas. The purpose of this and articles which it was intended should follow, was to consider the advantages and difficulties attendant upon a continuation of Gurkha recruitment on the scale of the past, and to devise means by which this end could be obtained to the benefit of all concerned. The Delhi announcement makes it desirable to publish some background concerning Nepal's connection with Britain, but not to comment upon the agreement until more details of the proposed scheme are known.

A SMALL percentage of our population possibly know that "the Gurkhas" come from Nepal, combining this geographical condition with the more common idea that the Gurkha is just another of the "subject" races of India which go to form our Indian Army: that he is funny about the face, which is apparently turned out in a rather Mongolian mould issued to pattern by a celestial Quartermaster's Stores; and that he has an engaging smile which seems at variance with most disconcerting bedtime stories about the use he makes of a sickle-moon knife. Most of which is absurd. What, then, is the truth?

This article makes no appeal to sentiment but only to self-interest and some degree of national decency. In consequence no further reference will be made to the services rendered, the almost incredible gallantry and loyalty shown, over more than 130 years and not least in the two years called "great," on behalf of the Crown and Empire by these mercenary soldiers. They would be the last to plead along such lines—besides, they like it.

Nepal, then, is an independent autonomous state, in alliance with the Crown, and in no way subject to paramountcy as are all Indian States. The reality of Nepalese independence is perhaps best stressed by the fact that entry into Nepal is denied even to British officers and officials, except by special invitation of the Durbar, rarely issued and most difficult to obtain. When obtained, "penetration"

is absolutely confined to the lowlands and the immediate vicinity of the capital, Khatmandhu. The interior of the country, inhabited by the purer Mongolian or Tartar stock, is definitely a *terra clausa*.

Geographically only a small, and most unhealthy part of the country can be considered as comprised within the Indian peninsula, taking the Northern boundary of the latter as being formed by the Himalayas. That is to say, it is a mountainous land, in which communications are difficult and largely non-existent, while the terrain would render development of large-scale basic industries impracticable, even if such development were the policy of the Nepal Durbar, which up to date it emphatically is not. The agricultural population consumes, and can exist on, their own produce, but beyond such existence are dependent on exports for any betterment of conditions, whether such exports are seen or unseen. Actually they are almost entirely the latter, an important fact which will be developed later in these articles.

Nepal is bounded on the East by the Indian State of Sikkim—mountainous and undeveloped—to the South by the United Provinces, rich agricultural areas with good communications and a preponderantly unmartial people; to the West by Hill States almost as devoid of communications as Nepal herself, and to the North by the barren wastes of Tibet. The high significance of these dull

geographical facts is that the communications of Nepal with the outside world are entirely controlled by British India, and consequently will so be by the Indian Republic of the future—unless something is done about it now.

Ethnologically and historically we can be brief. Very broadly speaking we can divide the Nepalese, for any political purpose, into three groups. In the mountainous and least accessible North-West and North Central areas live the *Magars* and *Gurungs*, undoubtedly of Mongolian stock, self-sufficient, independent, cheerful fellows who have retained their "racial" purity to a marked degree, and from whom the main recruitment for our Forces derives. They are purely agricultural except for the most primitive "cottage" industries. The North-East areas are inhabited mainly by the *Limbus*, *Rais* and *Lepchas*, with their various sub-divisions. For our purpose it is perhaps hardly necessary to discriminate between these and the *Magars* and *Gurungs*, but it may be worth noting that they have a Tartar strain which tends to a greater affinity with the Bhutan and Tartar races of the North-East. They are quick-tempered and more inclined to mental "ups and downs" than their more phlegmatic cousins to the West—possibly, as so often in the East, an indication of greater racial mixture.

Thirdly, we have the lowlanders, generally and rather incorrectly known as the *Khas* Gurkhas—and there it is necessary to tread delicately at the risk of some possible obscurity. It is essential, however, to establish the real ethnological divergence between the inhabitants of the area marching with the future Indian Republic and the more primitive peoples of the highlands. Let it suffice to say that here we have a very strong *Rajput* strain from India, and to note that whereas the strength of this strain naturally varies considerably, its strength inclines to increase with the social standing of the individual, culminating in the ruling House. The ability to grow a full beard may at first sight appear an insufficient reason for deterring foreigners (or education) from visiting those of one's subjects who are metabolically unable to follow one's example, but in these days of the popular cry for self-determination by ethnological blocs there is a great deal more in it than immediately meets the eye. In any case this racial affinity in high places to *Rajput* stock, and a certain coyness about disseminating the fact in the highlands, should be borne in mind when considering the possible relations between Nepal and the Indian Republic.

The State religion is Hinduism, and this is subscribed to (the word is used advisably) by all classes. The general attitude of the highlanders is "when in Rome, do as the Romans do; when not, do as you please." Beyond what may be read between the lines in the above short ethno-

logical survey, it will be necessary to touch on the history of Nepal only shortly before and since the British connection commenced, and that only in so far as it may help towards an understanding of our moral liabilities and the difficulties inseparable from her future relations with India.

It must be clearly understood that the present picture, so far painted of a happy agricultural people, content to cultivate their own soil in peace and isolation and only asking to be left alone to do so, with an outlet for the more adventurous through mercenary service under the British Crown, is the creation of the British rule in India and of our relations for 130 years with Nepal. But as such it can be most dangerously misconstrued as to the future. In the course of the 17th and 18th centuries Nepal had shown marked characteristics and ability not only as a marauding but also as an expansionist State. Her marauding proclivities were naturally enough confined to the lowlands of Oudh and Rohilkund, and of Bengal, especially in the latter direction, where both people and "going" were soft and the spoils immense. The story goes (no doubt from old man Ben Trovato) that on the Nepal Durbar complaining that "receipts" from Bengal seemed to be reacting to the law of diminishing returns, the commander in the field replied with an assurance that there was neither a gold mohur nor a virgin left in Bengal, but that he was sending a crore of ears as an earnest of his desire to do his best. Be that as it may, "Johnnie" is not a popular figure in Bengal to this day, although, like the devil, very much respected.

Nepal showed, however, no desire to annex a country unsuitable climatically to her people, no doubt correctly fearing the deterioration inseparable from a descent from the hills into the plains of Central and Eastern India. But it was far otherwise with her expansion along the mountainous tracks to the West. In this direction her conquests carried her almost to the borders of Kashmir, and showed a considerable permanent expansionist ability. The hill areas now known as Garhwal and Kumaon were annexed and so successfully incorporated, that during our own Nepalese wars some of the stiffest resistance to our Forces was shown by *Garhwalis* and *Kumaonis* fighting under the aegis of Nepal. But here Nepal came up against two factors which checked further expansion and eventually caused the relinquishment of her external conquests and their incorporation into British India. These factors were the rise of the Sikh power in the Punjab and further British expansion from Bengal to the North-West. It is from here that our own connection with Nepal properly begins.

(To be continued.)

NOW THAT THE LINGGADJATI AGREEMENT IS SIGNED

by Roy Sherwood

IN looking at the present situation in Indonesia, the first need is to realise that the signing, on March 25th, of the Linggadjadi Agreement, does not mean that the long negotiations have been brought to a successful conclusion in every particular. To see things in the right perspective, the very special manner in which the signing of the Agreement was brought about must be borne in mind.

The negotiations appeared to have come to a complete deadlock almost up to the moment of the announcement that the document was about to be signed. Recapitulating the facts shortly, here is what had happened. When the proposed agreement was debated in the Lower House at The Hague, it was pointed out to its numerous critics that, being a "basic accord," it did not require parliamentary ratification. That stage would be reached later only when a detailed agreement had been worked out and the question of constitutional amendments had been studied. Despite this the House attached certain "notes of interpretation" to the draft agreement and made it plain that the Commission-General were to be authorised to sign the agreement only subject to these terms of interpretation.

The Republicans would have none of this, and during the long weeks of search for a solution, the recurrence of minor clashes between the military forces of the two sides had been causing a steady deterioration in the general situation. Then, suddenly, as things began to look really black, it was announced that the text of a most important letter addressed by the Indonesian Prime Minister to the Commission-General had been sent on urgently to the Netherlands Government at The Hague. A few days later, at first still surrounded by an air of secrecy, there was revealed a typically Eastern piece of diplomacy, full credit for which must go to the ingenuity of Mr. Soetan Sjahrir. His letter had contained this suggestion: that the Commission-General should sign the Agreement as defined and limited by the notes of interpretation, and the Indonesian delegation would sign the Agreement *minus* the notes. Both sides could thus in all sincerity adhere to their own viewpoints, but the deadlock would be broken and the negotiations could be resumed; and, after this telling demonstration by both sides of their fundamental wish for agreement—but also their scrupulous refusal to sign anything they could not accept—the further course of the discussions would be likely to run more smoothly.

It is this clever compromise, super-imposed upon a compromise agreement, that now governs the situation between the Netherlands and the Republic. In view of the need, for the sake of historical accuracy, of thus establishing the true value of the agreement in force at present, it is good to note that, so far at least, the fact that the two

sides have signed different things has not proved disastrous. But difficulties remain plentiful.

In the meantime, the Netherlands Prime Minister, Dr. Beel, and the Minister for Overseas Territories, Mr. J. A. Jonkman, have arrived in Java. They are there to "see for themselves," to establish personal contact with the Indonesians, to accentuate the fact of close collaboration with them, and possibly also to settle "the choice of personalities on the Dutch side to whom the conduct of affairs should be entrusted" at this important stage. This, of course, raises once again the question of Dr. van Mook's resignation, which has been rumoured so often that many observers no longer take it seriously. But it is a fact that the Acting Governor-General has more than once expressed his desire to be relieved from his duties, while two other points are also stressed by shrewd observers: the first is that Dr. van Mook is still *Acting* Governor-General, in substantive rank only *Lieutenant* Governor-General, so that it is possible at any time to appoint a hierarchical superior to him; the second, that the Commission-General, instead of three, has at present only two members because the place vacated by Mr. de Boer's resignation has never been filled.

The Netherlands Minister for Finance, Professor Lieftinck, has also left for Java via the United States. His particular preoccupation is, of course, mainly economic, and his meetings with Dr. van Mook, who has also arrived in the States, are naturally linked in every observer's mind with recent reports of a great American reconstruction loan for Indonesia. In this connection the amount of three hundred million dollars is being freely mentioned, and in view of America's palpable anxiety to re-establish world trade as quickly as possible, it is not surprising that the newly appointed U.S.A. Ambassador to the Netherlands, Mr. Herman B. Baruch, should be reported to have allowed it to be understood that his country is "keenly interested in the early implementation" of the Linggadjadi Agreement.

The Republic, in the meantime, is experiencing the first difficulties of its new responsibilities. The *Partai Rajad Pasoendan*—Soedanese People's Party—is agitating and demonstrating energetically for autonomy within the Republic. Mr. Sjahrir and other Republican Ministers have been endeavouring to play down the importance of this movement, but it is real and may have to be taken into account before the final terms of the political reconstruction, and those of the future relationship between the various parts of the proposed United States of Indonesia, become fixed. The Republicans allege that *Pasoendan* is Dutch-inspired, but this is strenuously denied on the Dutch side.

MALAYA IN THE MELTING POT

by D. R. Rees-Williams, M.P.

IT has been said that happy is the country which has no history. Before the late war this was true of Malaya, but since the war has ended the country has had more history than it either expected or desired. Malaya was one of the few countries in the East which did not desire constitutional change. It was, nevertheless, in the category mentioned by Shakespeare which has greatness thrust upon it and thrust upon it in such a way as to offend all its susceptibilities. When I visited Malaya a year ago, at the height of the agitation against the proposed constitutional changes, the Sultan of Perak, who is the leader of the Rulers, told me that he felt that he had been slapped in the face by an old friend. It was not the proposed changes in themselves that upset the Malays so much as the brusque way in which they were carried out.

I personally, had great sympathy with the Malays in the treatment they had received, and I was delighted when the Colonial Secretary took immediate steps to remedy the damage. The difficulty is that in Malaya, due to the wholesale immigration in the last quarter of a century, the non-Malay domiciled peoples form some 50 per cent. of the total population; the bulk of them being Chinese and Indians. Both races come to Malaya principally with the purpose of making money and returning to their own country. A small proportion remains and forms part of the permanently settled Chinese and Indian families. In religion, outlook, business methods and character these immigrant peoples are very different to the Malays. In many ways they are complementary, and wise statesmanship would ensure that there would be no friction between the two.

The British Government, when they were convinced that a mistake had been made in the manner of approach to the problem, joined in the appointment of a Working Committee to consider the question. Last December this Committee issued a report, the main principles of which advocated the establishment of a strong central government and the retention of local autonomy in the various Malay States and Settlements. They also suggested provisions to safeguard the special position of the indigenous inhabitants, the Malays, and provided a form of citizenship which was not to be considered as nationality. Broadly speaking, these proposals are acceptable to the Malays, although there have been reservations on the part of the Malay Nationalist Party, which is a republican body, in contradistinction to the United Malay Nationalist Organisation, which is conservative.

Following upon this report a Committee, under the Chairmanship of Mr. H. R. Cheeseman, was set up to discover the views of the other communities in the Peninsula, and these views have now crystallised. The Malay Nationalist Party declares that the plan is unacceptable and does not go far enough to meet the claims of the Malays. The council of Joint Action, which consists of a number of affiliated bodies drawn from eleven left-wing political parties and communal associations, has objected to the plan and lately the Pan-Malayan Conference of the Chinese

Chambers of Commerce, a very powerful organisation representative of the main body of wealthy people in the country, has issued a report.

When I was in Malaya, the communities, other than the Malays, took little part or even interest in the constitutional problem. They were not alive to its implications and in any case were busy in restoring trade to the country and did not wish to antagonise the Malays and perhaps endanger their fellow countrymen in remote districts. The Pan-Malayan Conference objects to the plan on the following grounds. First, that by reason of it, self-government will be made extremely difficult, if not impossible. Secondly, that the clauses dealing with the acquisition of federal citizenship are discriminatory, and would exclude the vast majority of the Malayan Chinese from the franchise. Thirdly, that it is obvious that the exclusion of Singapore from the Federation would entail endless difficulties and disadvantages.

They point out that the Chinese community, which constitutes nearly 40 per cent. of the total inhabitants of the Federation, will receive a representation of only 12½ per cent. of the membership of the Federal Legislative Council and 8 per cent. of the membership of the Federal Executive Council, at most. They also point out that 20,000 Chinese lives were sacrificed in the defence of Singapore and Malaya and as a result of the guerilla resistance offered to the invaders. They propose that there should be three basic principles on which the future constitution for Malaya should be founded. First a united Malaya, inclusive of Singapore. Secondly, responsible self-government through a fully elected central legislature for the whole of Malaya, and thirdly, equal citizenship rights and status for all making Malaya their permanent home and the object of their undivided loyalty. They recognise the special position of the Malays and are willing to co-operate in every way to safeguard their vital interests.

The Cheeseman Committee has lately issued its Report, which makes several recommendations. These, among other matters, suggest an increase in the number of unofficial members and lessen the time for residential qualification. The Governor's Advisory Council has approved the Report and recommended consultation on it by His Majesty's Government and the Rulers.

That is how the matter stands at the moment and I do not believe that basically the communities are far apart in their desires. In my experience in negotiating with Asiatic peoples, I have always found them reasonable and realistic.

The British Government is the final arbiter in this matter and it is essential, for the happiness and prosperity of Malaya, for the British good name and, indeed, since the rest of the world so urgently needs Malaya's products for world rehabilitation generally, that a sound and satisfactory settlement is rapidly achieved. We must hope, therefore, that His Majesty's Government will come to a firm understanding of the position and will act speedily, with justice and with statesmanship.

MODERN TIBET

by Edwin Haward

TIBET offers one of the great wide open spaces of the world. The vagueness of its existence is well illustrated by the fact that reference books credit it variously with an area sometimes assessed at 800,000 square miles and others 460,000 square miles. The population has been given as four million, three million or even as low as 800,000. These variations are due to uncertainty regarding the frontier line as between Tibet and China, of which Tibet is nominally a part. In the days of the Chinese Empire, China's sovereignty over Tibet was symbolised by the presence at Lhasa of a Chinese Amban, but since 1912 this diplomatic official has disappeared. By a Treaty of 1914 the autonomy of Tibet was recognised by Great Britain, but China, although a party to the negotiations, did not sign the Treaty because agreement could not be reached regarding the exact demarcation of the frontier.

Tibet is the one country in the world which is entirely in ecclesiastical control, for Tibetan Buddhism, as reformed by the great Tsongkapa in the 14th century, has provided through its monasteries the fabric of the administration. The monasteries are ruled by Lamas and the Dalai Lama, who is in Buddhist eyes the incarnation of Chenrezi, the God of Mercy, and the reincarnation of his predecessors, is the ruler. The present and 14th Dalai Lama is a minor, having been enthroned in February, 1940, at the age of 4½. During his minority, a Regent, the 23-year old head of the Reting Monastery, acts as ruler.

The country is appropriately called "the roof of the world" for it rests against the Himalayan range with a floor-level of 14,000 ft., an altitude at which the dry cold sunny climate demands robustness from its inhabitants. Its mineral resources have been untouched and, indeed, there is little knowledge of their extent although travellers' tales tell of fabulous wealth in inaccessible fastnesses behind the Himalayas. Tibetan sheep are world famous and wool is one of the country's most important exports, the chief customer being the United States of America. Meat, milk, cheese, salt and soda, are among the products of what otherwise is a barren country. The people are cheerful and good-natured, fighting the asperities of their climate with barley, beer and sun.

To approach Tibet from India the traveller takes a train from Calcutta to Siliguri, then he motors for 70 miles to Gangtok (the capital of Sikkim, which is the only Buddhist State of India), then rides horseback across the Tsangpo River to Lhasa in about 22 stages. It is on this "roof of the world" that the great rivers of Asia find their sources. First, there are the Indus and its tributary of the Sutlej starting their respective careers in the western end of Tibet. Not far from their source the Brahmaputra begins its long journey North of the Himalayas until it turns sharply South in the East of Tibet to enter India by Assam. Burma's Salween and China's Yangtse and Yellow

Rivers also rise in the Tibetan plateau which, therefore, is a veritable nursery of giant rivers.

What part can or will Tibet play in the post-war Asia? In modern times its autonomy and China's pre-occupation with the task of building up a young republic have helped Tibet to develop her own individuality with the minimum of outside interruption, but China has always taken a keen interest in Tibetan affairs, and the spiritual authority of the Lamas of Tibet counts for much among the Buddhists of China. The 13th Dalai Lama, who died in 1933, ruled for 40 years. He was born in 1876 and enthroned in 1879 and after he came to his majority he underwent many vicissitudes and, indeed, at one time was a refugee from his country, but in the latter years of his reign he was regarded as one of the ablest of his line and he did much to assert and maintain Tibet's independence. Now Tibet is going through the always difficult period of regency and much will depend on the support the Regent gets from the Tibetans themselves and from the power which replaces British rule in India for the continuance of Tibetan independence. The country, fortunately perhaps for itself, is not attractive to its very powerful neighbours. It does not offer ready means of economic development. The strict ecclesiastical rule under which the people live has its attractions but also its drawbacks, among them a conservatism that resists the introduction of modern systems of public health and social organisation.

The population tends to diminish rather than increase. This is due in no small degree to the prevalence of diseases which could be kept in check if respect for modern medicine were encouraged. Modernity, however, does manage to intrude. For example, Lhasa has its own small hydro-electric system, which is managed by an English-trained Tibetan who was educated at Rugby and is now also the English translator to the Cabinet. Wireless has been installed at Lhasa as a means of communicating with India, but there are no newspapers and the abbots and monks have the formation of public opinion entirely in their own hands. The Cabinet is composed of four abbots, the senior of whom presides, and over the Cabinet is a Prime Minister, who never attends its meetings, but who reports to the Regent. The Regent in matters of foreign policy and monastic administration may directly consult the monasteries or take the opinion of the National Assembly. To the Cabinet are attached Secretaries, including lay officials but, generally speaking, lay authority is overshadowed by the church.

The rule of the Dalai Lama derives from the mystic traditions of Tibetan Buddhism. The succession is maintained on an ecclesiastical basis to which oracles, dreams and mysticism make contribution. When the Dalai Lama passes to the Eternal Fields his successor is to be found by inspiration which governs the selection of a male child to

become his reincarnation. So in 1933, when the 13th Dalai Lama died, it was some time before the abbots, under the direction of the Regent, were able to discover a successor. The Regent in 1935 visited a holy lake to the South-East of Lhasa. In the waters of that lake, 60 years before, the horse of the 13th Dalai Lama had been revealed. The Regent saw in the watery mirror the reflection of mysterious letters and a three-storied monastery, with gilded roof and turquoise tiles and a winding road leading East of the monastery to a pagoda-like eminence, opposite which was a small house with peculiar eaves. This was taken to indicate that the new Dalai Lama had been born in the Chinese district of Amdo, South-East of Lake Kokonor. Various other signs were sought, search parties were sent out and reports were regularly transmitted to Lhasa.

There is another high Lama, beside the Dalai Lama, who is known in China as the Panchen Lama and in India—after the name of his monastery—the Tashi Lama. This office too is now vacant for the Panchen Lama died in exile in China in 1937. The office of the Panchen Lama is purely spiritual, and in some respects takes precedence of the Dalai Lama's in ecclesiastical matters. Just before his death, the late Panchen Lama is said to have reported the existence of three young boys, one of whom might well be the child for which the parties were seeking. After two failures, a search party came upon a monastery, road and house, such as seemed to have been discerned in the Regent's visit to the sacred lake. The child of the house, born in June, 1935, was tested with possessions of the late Dalai Lama and his reactions were favourable. The report was made to the Tibetan Government that the true Dalai Lama had been found. Into this tale of mysticism and devotion, a modern note was imported. The Tibetan Government in the middle of 1938 used the radio to instruct the search party to bring the boy to Lhasa for test. Even then the search party's difficulties were not at an end, and a year elapsed before the journey to Lhasa could be made. On September 20th, 1939, at a place called "The Happy Nook," the chief of the Cabinet at Lhasa presented a white silk scarf to the leader of the search party in token of homage to the child, who had been brought thus far in a mule-litter. On October 8th, the litter entered Lhasa, where the boy was duly greeted as Dalai Lama and visited the great Temple, before being placed in the Dalai Lama's country-house, known as the "Jewel Garden," in the suburbs of the capital.

Who was this young candidate for the most mystical throne in the world? His name was Phamo Dhomdup. He had an elder brother who was already a Lama of the Kumbum monastery, the family birth place. His other brothers were children like himself aged twelve and eight. He also had a young married sister. On November 23rd, he was with his second brother initiated as a monk and renamed "The Holy One, Tender Glory, Might of Speech, Of Excellent Intellect, Absolute Wisdom, Holding the Doctrine Ocean-wide." In Tibetan eyes, as he by selection becomes the reincarnation of his predecessors, his accession is described as "the return to the Throne," a ceremony which was performed in the Potala or chief palace on February 13th, 1940, and after it, on the Golden Throne,

he gave audiences and blessings to a succession of dignitaries, including the representatives of foreign States.

As was appropriate, the central incident of this picturesque ceremony was the proffer of countless presents. The dignitaries included the British Government's representatives, who brought with them a gold watch, a gold Nightingale clock and a musical box, and also a pair of budgerigars, the last being included because of the boy's known liking for birds. There were other gifts too; among them a brick of gold fresh from the Calcutta Mint.

What happens to this little boy, who is now nearly twelve? For the next six years he will perform with the coolness and intelligence which already characterises him, the formal religious duties of his office. But he will also undergo a strenuous time of education at the hands of the Lamas who are appointed to train him for his high position. Tradition has always prescribed that the Dalai Lama once he has been enthroned should not be brought into direct contact with any women, and so the mother of the Dalai Lama has to surrender her duties to the monks around him. It is believed that the present Dalai Lama's mother, who is a lady of Amdo, is quite a notable figure in the streets of Lhasa with her three-plaited hair and Amdo dress. She has asserted herself with some success to temper this tradition and, although she cannot sleep in the Potala, where the Dalai Lama lives, she has so far been able to keep reasonably close to him by living in a building outside the Northern Gate. Perhaps, too, when the boy may be able, now and then, to leave the cold Potala, perched on the heights of a precipice, for the gentler atmosphere of the Jewel Garden, and then he and his mother may be able to meet more freely for a short time. It must not be forgotten that the Dalai Lama has to be guarded from the pollution of a woman's touch. Indeed, there is only one woman in Tibet who has the right of receiving the Dalai Lama's blessings directly on her head. Even then she is entitled to one hand only and not two for which the highest rank of Tibetan officials can claim.

On the population basis, Tibet is not an important country, but its vast expanses, the ever-widening scope of scientific knowledge, as applied to the resources of the world, its central position in Asia between three great countries, all of whose futures are by no means easy to define, must naturally give rise to speculation.

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BOOKS ON THE

by Kenneth Grenville Myer

Books received:—

Notice in this list does not preclude review in this or subsequent issues.

SINGAPORE POLICE BACKGROUND, by René Onraet. (Dorothy Crisp, 12s. 6d.)

IN SEVENTY DAYS, by E. M. Glover. (Frederick Muller, 8s. 6d.)

THE BASIS OF AN INDO-BRITISH TREATY, by K. M. Panikkar. (Oxford University Press, Cumberlege, 2s. 6d.)

A PICTURE OF INDIA, by Edwin Haward. (India-Burma Association, 9d.)

A GIRL IN BOMBAY, by Ishvani. (Pilot Press, 8s. 6d.)

THE LOST WAR, by Masuo Kato. (Alfred Knopf, New York.)

THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST, by F. S. C. Northrop. (Macmillan, 30s.)

THE books on my table this month deal either with India or Malaya. Let us first look at the eastern side of the Bay of Bengal. René Onraet set out for the East in the year of my birth to become a police cadet, the first rung of a ladder, which he eventually climbed to the very top; exactly twenty years later Edwin Glover sailed in that Grand ship, the *Rawalpindi*, to take up his appointment on the *Penang Gazette*, which was ultimately to lead him to the managing-editor's chair of the *Malaya-Tribune* group of newspapers. I was intrigued to discover that these words describe in a nutshell the differences between the two books.

In *SINGAPORE POLICE BACKGROUND* we find a careful account of almost everything that attracted the attention of René Onraet during the years he spent in Malaya. This is not a literary work: nor will you find in it the deft slick touch of the practised writer. It is a careful, painstaking, almost plodding appreciation (using the word in the military sense) of René Onraet's experiences. The results achieved are unexpectedly good. He is an acute and careful observer and has set down in plain unadorned prose what it is he has observed, and he presents an impartial and extremely interesting case for the continuance of British rule until such time as the peoples of Malaya are able to take over for themselves. The book is enlivened with many anecdotes, most of which, apart from their inherent interest, give authentic atmosphere to the work as a whole. He makes it clear that he knows what he is talking about, that here is an opinion, an informed opinion, and if it is not your opinion—why then, you must re-examine your own, for here opinion is backed by facts.

Some of the facts are elementary, for the writer, quite wisely, has not assumed that the reader has already some acquaintance with Malayan problems. He gives a short history of the country, for instance, and informs us that the Chinese, the Indians, and, of course, the Malays, who make up the population together with a sprinkling of Europeans and others, have each their own problems for the police officer. René Onraet writes of police administration and Governors, of tourists, moneylenders, and headmen; but it is in the chapters on subversive activities—and Communism in particular—which will excite the interest of the reader. This ex-Inspector-General of Police

FAR EAST

stresses the point that "from the very outset, subversive activities in Malaya were due to outside influences. There was no irritant in Malaya to give rise to such a reaction. There was no organisation within Malaya which was capable of producing such clever political propaganda." This is a book which should be read by anyone who doubts British achievements in Malaya.

About the time when René Onraet screws on the top of his pen with a sigh of regret to be leaving Singapore, Edwin Maurice Glover shrugs down to his typewriter. **IN SEVENTY DAYS** is a swiftly moving account of the fall of Malaya, written by an accomplished journalist. He tells of conditions there before the war, of his campaign in the newspapers for the recognition of Asiatic talent and public spirit in the sphere of local government, and his enthusiasm for the raising of Malay troops for defence, a project neglected even after war broke out by the "one-man government" of Sir Shenton Thomas. He describes the air-raids and the sinking of the two capital ships, *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, and emphasises the complete supremacy in the air enjoyed by the Japanese.

Mr. Glover exploits to the full his skill with words to produce a colour-story expanded to a full-length book; and does not hesitate to use direct quotation to enhance the effect, and incidentally to avoid giving the impression of heavy reading by the exposure of more white paper to the reader's eye. I am always dubious of this—if these are not the exact words used, quotation marks are unnecessary, and oblique narration is to be preferred. No doubt Mr. Glover kept a diary, but did he really record such trivia as the following? "Tim is not back yet," said Veronica, "but he 'phoned to say he may be home for an hour or two, or maybe for the night—he sounded damned weary." Surely in what purports to be an accurate and factual account of serious matters the use of direct quotation implies that these words, and no others, were actually spoken? There is implicit a guarantee that the speaker did not say something like that, but that those very words were used. Now in the extract I have quoted it obviously matters very little what was the form of words, but if quotation is lightly used, even in one paragraph, it casts a shadow of doubt over the whole work, which in this case would be a pity. To give point to the remarks I made in my first paragraph **SINGAPORE POLICE BACKGROUND** has an unnecessary but useful map of part of what was once pathetically called the Co-Prosperity Sphere, while I was unable to discover one in **IN SEVENTY DAYS**—although it would have been of great assistance in tracing the rapidity of the Japanese advance—but this book is illustrated with photographs of diverse subjects, including a modest portrait of the author.

And now to India. **THE BASIS OF AN INDO-BRITISH TREATY**, by K. M. Panikkar, makes a plea for a treaty between India and the United Kingdom on purely strategical grounds. The necessity for a defensive alliance between those countries on the edge of the great continental land-mass, which is the Old World (excluding Africa) and which Mr. Panikkar calls Rimland, is to him

paramount, and he sets out to prove that the two countries are interdependent. On occasion Mr. Panikkar embellishes his text with flashes of sardonic humour; of Curzon he says: "... he was truly in the line of the Great Moghuls." Elsewhere he refers to "The Honourable East India Company Bahadur." Neat epitomes! Whether Mr. Panikkar is over-optimistic about the part that India can play in any future war is open to question: for the sake of world peace, let us hope not.

Some light on this point is thrown by **A PICTURE OF INDIA**, by Edwin Haward, which is generously illustrated by photographs of an intrinsic as opposed to a "dramatic" interest. This pamphlet is ablaze with facts. I would, however, correct the spelling of Edwin Montagu's name, which is as it appears here, and point out that the credit for the reforms is generally given to Mr. Montagu and the then Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford. Although a post-war publication, Mr. Haward has not forgotten to include a large number of pictures of the "real" or timeless India, some of which may well make the reader who loves the country, home-sick for the long, dusty roads, the creaking bullock-carts, and the friendly hospitality of the village. It was, of course, impossible for Mr. Haward even to mention every facet of the many-sided jewel which is the Indian way of life, but in his fifty odd pages he cannot fail to interest the general reader, and as a result no doubt many will want to delve for further information.

THE LOST WAR

by M. D. Kennedy

DURING the war years, Japanese Press reporters played their part in the Japanese propaganda machine. Masuo Kata, the author of the recently published book *The Lost War* (Alfred Knopf, New York) was no exception. But, far from being a more propagandist attempt to whitewash Japan and its people, this extremely interesting and enlightening book is a frank and revealing account of the experiences and reactions of a well-placed observer, as development followed development, from the days immediately preceding Pearl Harbour down to the final capitulation.

Kato, who had had previous experience abroad as a Press correspondent, was in Washington during the talks just before Pearl Harbour and was in close touch with those taking part in them. Though he has hard things to say about Tojo and other Army leaders, his testimony on behalf of Admiral Nomura, the Ambassador, bears out that of other close observers regarding the genuine efforts of Nomura himself to reach an amicable settlement. Nomura, however, was kept in the dark by his own Government on such vitally important matters as Japanese troop movements in Indo-China, while the Japanese public was kept equally ignorant of America's reactions to these and other developments, as many of the despatches sent by Kato and other Japanese Press correspondents from Washington were withheld from publication in Japan.

With the outbreak of war, Kato was interned for some months in the U.S. and was then repatriated, returning to a Japan flushed with victory and intoxicated with success. Knowing both Britain and America at first hand, this excessive confidence was never wholly shared by himself, though he admits to having been carried away by it to some extent for a time; but the work to which he was consigned gave him access to foreign broadcasts, a source of information absolutely debarred to all but a handful of his countrymen, and he soon came to realise the deterioration which began to set in soon after.

His own reaction to the war, which he describes as "typical of that of many who considered themselves liberals," is worth quoting:

"However wrong I believed my country to be, it was my country just the same, and perhaps some day it would come to its senses. My biggest misjudgment was during the period when the militarists were coming to power. I was aware of what was happening, but I believed that the Japanese people would have enough commonsense at the critical moment to avoid being carried into war. After that I looked toward the inevitable defeat as a cure that could be found no other way."

Later in the book, after expressing a sense of shame at "the complete submission of the newspapers to the reactionary movement," he makes this confession:

"I realised that as a journalist there was a responsibility which I had somehow shirked. True, the Press had not been free to defend human rights: but why had it not fought against the first shadow of totalitarianism that threatened to destroy its freedom and render it impotent? The swift disappearance of tolerance had made opposition impossible."

Kato's personal reactions should not be taken as typical of those of his countrymen as a whole, but they throw a light on the reactions of the more intelligent and enlightened section of the Japanese people, and his confession regarding his responsibility as a journalist gives food for thought in other countries besides Japan.

It was not until late in 1944, by which time Allied air raids on Japan had started to bring the meaning of war properly home to the masses of the people, that the public at large began to realise that the flamboyant communique about Japanese victories and military prowess were not easy to square with their own experience. The earlier raids, which were on a relatively small scale, served as something of a stimulant to morale and had a touch of romance and adventure about them, but as they increased in number and magnitude and left their trail of devastation and terrible suffering, civilian morale, already affected by food shortage and war-time austerities, began to decline perceptibly.

How devastating and demoralising were these monster raids is clearly indicated by the vivid account of them given in these pages, raids far more ghastly than any experienced in Europe. In one raid alone, that of March 9th, 1945, on Tokio, the official figures accounted for 78,660 dead and 1½ million rendered homeless; but Kato regards this as an under-estimate and considers that the actual number killed was fully 100,000, a figure greater even than the number killed by the atomic bomb in Hiroshima.

By this time, attempts were already being made behind the scenes to find an honourable way out of the war, and it is of interest to learn that amongst those engaged in

this task was General Homma, who was later to face a firing squad in Manila. Those who, like the present reviewer and many other former British officers, knew Homma personally and held him in high respect, can bear out Kato's tribute to him as "surprisingly liberal-minded, with a broad, international view of world affairs." This tribute is all the more striking as coming from one who had no great liking for the Japanese Army leaders as a whole.

Thumb-nail sketches of Konoye, Tojo, Togo, Matsukata, Suzuki and other Japanese leaders are scattered throughout this book and, being penned by one writing with first-hand knowledge of them, add greatly to its value and interest. Of particular interest, however, are the concluding chapters describing the dramatic events leading to the Emperor's personal decision to "endure the unendurable and suffer the insufferable," the attempt to prevent his broadcast, the amazement with which the general public learned of the surrender, the spate of suicides which followed, the apprehensions regarding the arrival of Allied forces, the unexpected smoothness with which the occupation was effected and, finally, the scene on board the "Missouri" at the formal capitulation ceremony at which the author was present as a Press reporter. All these and many other events besides are described vividly and objectively, and help to make this book of very real interest to the serious student and general reader alike.

The Locust Danger

by Rupert Butler

THE locust is no respecter of national boundaries. The vast deserts of Saudi Arabia are the breeding ground for locusts which produce swarms which then devastate surrounding countries of the Middle East and invade East Africa and Persia. Swarms from Persia invade India and do great damage there, and swarms from India fly over the Red Sea to Africa. I have no information about China, but there are alarming recent reports from the Philippines, and from Borneo and Sarawak come vague Press reports of locust infestation.

No one who has experienced a visitation from a swarm of locusts can have any illusions concerning the significance of the locust menace. A cloud appears on the horizon and sweeps onwards until the sky overhead is darkened and full of the whirring of wings. Some strange act of collective will may decide the swarm to settle and every tree, every bush, every green thing becomes a crawling black and yellow mass. When they take off again, usually soon after dawn, no green remains. Where the swarm is small, no great harm is done except to unfortunate individuals, but where the swarms cover hundreds of square miles, and some have been reported up to 300 square miles, their depredations can dislocate a country's economy, especially if it be chiefly agricultural. It is of little use organising increased food production for the benefit of the locust.

So when the economic development of such countries as India and China is being considered, the locust must be taken seriously. Until comparatively recently, one just had to submit to it: the crude ameliorative methods available were of little use. In the past ten years, however, and particularly under the urgency of war demands, scientists have developed effective methods to combat these recurrent plagues, and it has been definitely shown that where efficient action has been taken, the menace can be kept under control.

For effective control it is essential to know the life and habits of the locust, its breeding grounds, the stage at which it can be most easily destroyed. It involves scientific research on the laboratory scale to determine the most efficacious poisons, and it requires very thorough investigation and organisation to apply these poisons on the vast scale necessary in the remote areas where the locust usually breeds. This is necessarily a most expensive business. The female locust lays up to a hundred eggs at a time several times a year. These are deposited in shallow holes in the earth in long cylindrical masses. In the tropics they may hatch out into the hopper (wingless) stage in two or three weeks. The hoppers feed on green vegetation and sometimes masses of them, covering an area several square miles in extent, move about the country doing enormous damage.

It is at this stage that they are most vulnerable. Several methods of destruction may be adopted. I have, myself, seen deep trenches dug in their line of march and these when full were sprayed with alcohol and ignited. A more effective method is to scatter over the ground bran moistened with *sodium arsenite* solution. This has been used on an enormous scale in Africa and the Middle East. The locusts prefer bran to vegetation, but it has to be moist bran, which means that the poisoned bait must be distributed either in the early morning or in the late afternoon to avoid drying out by the hot sun. Unfortunately, *sodium arsenite* is poisonous not only to locusts but to grazing animals as well. New poisons are, however, being introduced which are non-toxic to animals. The best known of these, and one which has already given excellent results on a large scale, is *gammexane* which is the trade name for the chemical *gamma benzene hexachloride*.

Hoppers develop into the winged migratory form in about forty days after hatching from the egg, so if they are to be destroyed as hoppers it is necessary to plan the transport and laying of bait well in advance, especially as the eggs are frequently laid in very remote desert areas. A very highly organised campaign was carried out in 1943, when it became of the utmost importance to safeguard vital food-producing areas in the Middle East. Careful reconnaissance over vast desert areas of Arabia showed that 50,000 square miles were infested by hoppers. A force of a thousand men with 350 vehicles took part in the attack, in which 1,200 tons of poisoned bait were used and 16,000 square miles of hoppers were destroyed. The result was that only a few small swarms flew over to India and Persia, and that these were easily controlled. Similar campaigns were undertaken in 1944-45 and in the following years. Big offensives have also been carried out in East Africa with forces of 6,000 men and hundreds of vehicles. These

figures give some idea of the amount of effort required. Its cost is very great and can only be borne by international co-operation both in finance and facilities.

These large-scale operations have been directed against locusts in the hopper (wingless) stage. Recently experiments have been made in Kenya and Persia with methods of attack against the winged adult locusts. Swarms which have settled have been dusted from aeroplanes with powdered *D.N.O.C.* (*dinitro-ortho-cresol*) and good results obtained, but technical difficulties have been experienced in distributing dry dust from an aeroplane travelling at 120 miles an hour. It is reported that better results are obtained when the *D.N.O.C.* is mixed with oil and sprayed on to the swarm. Now that *Gammexane* is in full industrial production, it is probable that it will be used in place of *D.N.O.C.* There are also reports of a new *chlorinated hydrocarbon* with the trade name of *Velsicol 1068* which in small field tests has been found to be twice as toxic as *Gammexane* when applied in an oil spray to the Lesser Migratory Locust.

There is no doubt that immense losses will be suffered in many parts of the Far East unless far-reaching counter-measures are organised. It has been conclusively shown by the result of campaigns in the Middle East and East Africa that locust invasions can be rendered relatively innocuous if appropriate measures are taken. Great efforts, involving great expense is needed. Can the Far East afford not to afford them?

BURMA TEAK

by Saw K'Pi

IN my office in London there is a piece of Burma teak. It is a cross section cut from a tree when I was engaged in the operation of extracting teak logs from their felling sites in the far-away forests in Burma and transporting them to the timber mills near the sea.

The section was cut at about 10 ft. from ground level when the tree was dead and without bark. Its girth is 8 ft. 6 in. and its diameter is 33 in. As it has been well polished the annular rings are plain to see and these have been counted by an expert of the Burma Forest Service, who has marked on the appropriate ring a corresponding date of historical interest.

When the tree was some nine inches in girth the year of our Lord was 1605—the year of the Gunpowder Plot. When it was some 300 years old, in 1899, the Boer War was fought. Yet it was perfectly sound when killed by axing a girdle around it through the bark and sapwood. Had not human beings interfered with its growth, there seems no reason why the tree should not have lived through the second World War and thus have included more time of human strife in its existence. (After girdling a teak tree stands put three years, after which it is buoyant and seasoned.)

What a life! Weather changes did not affect its soundness, fires, which sweep through the forests year by year, could not damage its timber nor could the cyclonic winds uproot it. Termites and all their like broke their jaws on

it. After felling it was measured, marked and cut up into logs; there was not a single blemish in any of its length and the tree yielded some six tons of sound first-class timber.

In their journey from their forest home the logs passed through a variety of phases. As its stump was 1,700 ft. up on a rocky and steep hillside elephants struggled to it and slid the logs down until they reached the crest of a lower spur, along which the elephants dragged them to the hill-foot, a distance of three or four miles. The ground there was level enough for buffaloes to take the place of the more valuable and agile elephants. If this phase occurred in the rainy season, ten or 12 pairs of buffaloes would be needed to drag the largest of the logs along the muddy, sodden drag-path eight miles to the head-waters of a rocky, tortuous hill stream. If the extraction took place in the dry season, when the ground was harder than our farm tracks here in the dryest summer, the logs would be loaded on to carts. One pair of buffaloes would bear the yoke and as many pairs as necessary would be hitched in tandem fashion, and off they would go to the floating stream. Here they would be unloaded and all the logs would be rolled into the stream bed which, in the rainy season would be a swift flowing surge of muddy flood water and in the dry season possibly perfectly dry.

In the next phase elephants would again take a hand and, when freshets deepened the stream sufficiently, would push the launched logs into the current on which they were carried down-stream to the larger river below. Logs in a rise are much like mules in a stampede. A kind one will follow the current and negotiate the bends like a University boat crew; unkind ones will get into all conceivable trouble; they seem to find every underwater snag; one will push its nose into a crevice between two rocks, so firmly that it will catch and hold up hundreds of its companions; another will fasten itself on an obstacle mid-stream and so change the flow of the current as to drive the following logs into the bank, where they pile up into jams as high as a house.

It is under these conditions (and on the hillsides) that the work of a well-trained elephant is a marvel to watch. Directed by his bare-footed rider, who imparts his instructions by voice in co-operation with the wagging of his toes behind the beast's ears, the elephant pulls, pushes and rolls away at the "key" log, loosens it and stands back as, with a roar, the restrained waters burst through and the pumping of teak against teak (a sound of its own) heralds the breaking of the jam.

The small floating stream grows wider and perhaps deeper as it flows towards its parent river until logs float freely by themselves to a spot where villagers in their scores, paddling little dugouts, save them and tie them up to the river bank alongside their bamboo-hutted villages.

The logs are collected by experienced raftsmen, formed into rafts of handy size, bound together with canes, strengthened by cross poles and provided with ropes and sweeps—ropes to tie up at night, sweeps to assist in keeping the cumbrous mass on its straight and safe way on the bosom of the mighty Irrawaddy, up and down which there is a constant flow of traffic ranging from the great passenger and cargo steamers, smaller paddy boats,

sailing craft, sampans and dugout canoes. A crew of six or eight men travel on each raft. A little grass-walled and roofed hut constructed at the centre of the raft would be their home during their voyage of possibly 1,000 miles down to the Rangoon timber mills. Their wives might accompany some of the raftsmen, with their children, dogs and even cats and chickens. Stores were loaded or bought en route and cooking is done in their little hut.

This long journey would follow the end of the rainy season, when the level of the Irrawaddy was falling daily, and, in the early mornings when the river was blotted out beneath a heavy cloud of cotton-wool mist, it would be bitterly cold. By the time they reached Rangoon the cold weather would have changed to the hot season and the crew would have become almost black through sunburn. The mills dealt with the logs without loss of time and the converted squares, planks, boards, scantlings, railway key, parquet floor blocks, etc., were passed into use and turned into money.

It would be difficult to say where these things finally come to rest, for teak is used for so many purposes. Walls the decks of steamers, both passenger and cargo, and you walk on teak deck planks; go by train and you travel in carriages partly constructed of and possibly panelled with teak—over steel rails held tightly to their sleepers by teak keys; if particularly fortunate you may possess bedroom and dining-room furniture suites of teak. The doors, window frames and floor of your house may be of teak and, if they are, you need have no fear of them "moving" in any change of weather.

Nearer its home the best houses are built entirely of teak, teak posts, teak wallings, teak floors, teak rafters and even teak shingles. The boats most sought after are those made of teak, and many a first-class log has disappeared whilst en route to the mills to reappear as a Burmese racing boat.

When looking at the piece of teak in my office the other day and ruminating on its long life, I was reminded of another big teak tree. I had found the "very father and mother of all teak trees" when exploring the forests near the Burma/Siam frontier. At breast height it measured over 20 feet in circumference but, unfortunately, it was unsound, fluted and not cylindrical. The stocky Karen clerk, who accompanied me, was despatched next day with some other Karen to fell the tree, but in the evening he reported they had not done as instructed as they had been chased away by a bear.

Next morning I went with them—I did not quite believe his story—and sure enough there around and around the tree were the footmarks of a man intermingled with those of a bear. How many times the two encircled the tree I do not know and the Karen may have exaggerated when he said that before the bear gave up the chase he felt he could continue running no longer. As he was a typical hillman, broad and deep chested and with muscles as hard as the teak he felled, the contest must have been a long one.

His fellows told me that they had seen the bear approaching but the Karen was then on the blind side of the tree and they did not wait to see the meeting between the bear and the clerk!

ECONOMIC SECTION

JAPAN'S IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY

by Felix Wirth

THE picture of Japan's post-war economic power has in recent weeks partially emerged from the mist of post-Armistice uncertainty, mainly as a result of three important moves having a direct bearing on that country's industrial set-up.

Probably the most important of these has been a Washington announcement that the Far Eastern Commission had decided to fix the Japanese industry at its 1930-34 level. The Japanese themselves, it is understood, believe that it will enable them, if they can obtain the necessary materials from abroad, to regain virtually all their former markets.

The second significant step has been the issue, in April last, of an interim United States directive to the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers in Japan, authorising him to make immediately available, as advance reparation transfers, Japanese industrial facilities to certain war-devastated countries.

A spokesman of the Far Eastern Commission said that removals under this interim directive will add up to 30 per cent. of industrial capacity. Plants declared available total approximately 1,000, divided into ten categories of which the main ones are: iron and steel; shipbuilding; thermal-electric power; machine tools, aircraft industry; army and navy arsenals; and a number of categories of chemical industries. The U.S. statement said inter alia: "This directive will provide that four specific countries immediately receive out of Japanese industrial facilities which the Far Eastern Commission has already decided to be available for removals, certain items capable of immediate employment for relief purposes. Those four countries have been assigned percentages which clearly do not prejudice their own or any other country's interest in the final national percentage shares of Japanese reparations. China will receive 15 per cent. of such facilities; the Philippines 5 per cent.; the Netherlands (for the Indies) 5 per cent.; and the United Kingdom (for Burma, Malaya and its colonial possessions in the Far East) 5 per cent. The United States will receive nothing for itself under the advance transfers programme."

What is, in these circumstances, the significance and the background of the term "the 1930-34 industrial level"? It was not until February, 1945, that raids against the

Japanese islands reached a scale comparable with those on Germany prior to Allied invasion of the Continent. This means that the heavy aerial offensive was really restricted to a period of six months before Japan's capitulation. As in the case of Germany it has been found that the bombing of heavy industry had only relatively slow repercussions on the Japanese war machine, while the campaign to destroy the enemy's air force had an almost immediate effect. As a result of priority given to the task of destruction of the Japanese Air Force, the industrial effects of the aerial war on Japan contributed to the elimination of such war plants as aircraft factories, oil refineries and storage plant, tanks and key communication centres. But the basic industries, especially the iron and steel and the textile industries, have suffered relatively little during the hostilities.

The problem of the level of Japanese industries has long agitated American opinion, and the recent ruling of the Far Eastern Commission, referred to above, by no means settles the question except in a most general way. It is interesting to note that this decision shows a considerable scaling down of the level of the iron and steel industry, the usual yardstick of industrial activity, compared with a decision of about a year ago. The latter, dated June 12th, 1946, had recommended a limitation of Japan's production to 3,500,000 tons of ingots and 2,000,000 tons of pig iron. While the former figure corresponds to the output of 1934 (one of the target years) the latter is equivalent to the home consumption of 1936, i.e., the time when Japan's armament drive had already been well under way.

The following table shows the difficulties in forming an exact picture of what the most recent decision to bring Japanese industry down to the 1930-1934 level really means. It will be noted that compared with the generally steady rise of the home production of pig iron, Japan's output of steel had more than doubled in the brief span of three years.

Production and Imports 1930-1945.
(In '000 metric tons.)

Year	PIG IRON		CRUDE STEEL	
	Home Production	Total available (including imports)	Home Production	Total available (including imports)
1930	1,162	—	—	—
1931	917	1,412	1,883	1,883
1932	1,102	1,752	2,398	2,398
1933	1,437	2,238	3,198	3,203
1934	1,728	2,506	3,844	3,904
1935	1,865	2,958	4,704	4,938
1936	1,972	3,067	5,233	5,654
1937	2,252	3,383	5,801	6,355
1938	2,467	3,539	6,472	7,200
1939	3,068	3,995	6,696	7,370
1940	3,417	4,271	6,856	7,519
1941	4,088	4,872	6,844	7,574
1942	4,119	4,997	7,044	7,947
1943	3,804	4,800	7,833	8,778
1944	2,564	3,227	5,849	6,379
1945	502	—	1,067	—

(Source: British Iron and Steel Federation, London.)

The most detailed, so far, though unofficial, American statement concerning proposed restrictions on Japan's post-war industry, came from the influential National Engineers Committee appointed by the U.S. Engineers' Joint Council.

In a seven-point programme* submitted to various United States Government Departments, the Committee propose that Japan's record 1943 iron and steel production of over nine million tons be reduced to about 20 per cent. They estimate her post-war requirements of rolled products at 1,600,000 tons involving a total steel-making capacity of 2.5 million ingot tons, which they suggest should be concentrated in three of four of the most efficient open-hearth plants.

Of the three million tons of electric furnace capacity remaining on VJ-Day, the Committee propose that 250,000 tons should be left, sufficient for a production of 230,000 ingot tons. This would leave some 2,750,000 tons of electric steel-making capacity available for reparation or destruction. Pig iron production, they contend, should be limited to 1,500,000 tons annually (i.e., about 65 per cent. of the permissible ingot tonnage) plus 50,000 tons of foundry iron for castings. But if, in practice, the home supply of steel scrap proved more than sufficient for the 2.3 million tons of ingots, the authorised amount of pig iron should be decreased accordingly. It is considered that there is an ample supply of scrap available for some years to come, if collected and handled effectively.

The American Committee recommend that Japan's machine tool production capacity of 20,000 to 25,000 units per year should be maintained to meet the essential requirements of her peace-time industry. Twenty firms are the principal builders, and their production should be equal to the replacement needs of other war-making industries. Estimating that Japan now has about 1,100,000 machine

tools (mostly of pre-war foreign make) in operating conditions, the report advises the elimination of about half of these, mostly in industrial plants which were the basic support of Japan's war potential.

Finally the report stresses that no iron and steel exports should be permitted, except where necessary to prevent serious disruption to the economies of countries previously dependent upon Japan.

A still stricter view of the level of industrial activity was reportedly held by the American occupation authorities in Japan. The British Iron and Steel Federation paper on Japan states that General McArthur's officials had favoured an authorised total output of 1,300,000 ingot tons, which was the general level of requirements during the period 1917-1925, when about 50 per cent. was covered by imports. Thereafter, war preparations stepped up the demand at an increasing rate, while at the same time development of the iron and steel industry had enabled dependence upon imports to be reduced and had established a production basis which, even after war damage, still exceeds the 1917-1925 level.

The period 1917-1925 also covers an increase in constructional activity following upon the 1923 earthquake, when greater demands were made on steel for constructional purposes. In post-war building the Japanese will doubtless again take the opportunity of replacing wooden dwellings with steel-framed or reinforced concrete structures and due allowance had been made for the fact that post-war steel requirements for non-industrial purposes will be greater than in the past. In considering this tremendous problem it should be remembered that, within three months of the start of regular heavy bombing, half of the built-up area of the big cities was devastated and four to five million people made homeless. The minimum building requirements, to cover damage for that period only, are thus equivalent to over one million housing units.

The preceding survey shows some of the difficulties which are bound to come up in efforts to estimate the exact level of Japan's post-war iron and steel industry (and with it, of other industries) even with the knowledge of the limits arrived at officially, or of suggestions, official or unofficial. There can be little doubt, however, that the drastic reduction of the industry's size will carry with it beneficial technical results.

This does not mean that Japan did not enter the war with a fairly well integrated and co-ordinated iron and steel industry. By the time the war broke out the Japanese possessed both the technical knowledge and the engineering facilities for the building of all types of equipment and furnaces used by the iron and steel industry, and also had very able furnace technologists capable of obtaining proper equipment performance.

Compared with pre-war, however, Japan is likely to face a struggle, in the initial post-Treaty period at least, for the procurement of essential raw materials from overseas. It is worth recalling in this context that Japan is not well endowed either with iron ore or coal. Her iron ore is

* Information on Japan's iron and steel industry quoted here is based on a paper prepared by the British Iron and Steel Federation (Intelligence Department).

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LEATHER and RUBBER FOOTWEAR

low grade, and the deposits (totalling less than the U.S.A.'s annual production) are inconveniently located in the difficult mountainous districts; her limited reserves of coal are unsuited for coking and the mines have a one-sided location in the Eastern and Western parts of the country.

Before the war, four-fifths of the raw materials for steel-making in the home islands were imported. The following table summarises the position in a typical pre-war year (1937). In addition, a considerable part of Japan's requirement of coking coal had to be imported, chiefly from China.

HOME ISLANDS: RAW MATERIAL POSITION, 1937.
(In '000 metric tons.)

Raw Material	Production	Imports	Total	Main Sources of Imports.
Iron Ore (metal content) ...	296	2,554	2,850	Malaya, China, Korea.
Pig Iron ...	(*)	1,131	1,131	India, Russia, Manchuria.
Scrap ...	704	2,420	3,324	United States of America.
	1,000	6,016	7,305	

(*) Only imports of pig iron are shown, since the metal raw material for the home production is shown as iron ore.

(Source: British Iron and Steel Federation.)

The present position of the Japanese iron and steel industry reflects the cumulative difficulties resulting from the military defeat and the grave shortages of domestic and imported raw materials. Her present overall crude steel production of 40,000 to 60,000 tons monthly is obviously far short of current domestic needs, but coal shortage presents the unavoidable limiting factor. With a view to the more economical use of the coal supplies available it was decided in July, 1946, to concentrate all Japanese iron and steel operations at the Yawata Plant. This arrangement was to continue until March, 1947, unless there was an improvement in the coal situation.

What of the future of the Japanese industry? The reduction of her iron and steel output to the suggested 1930-34 limits may in its train reverse the main industrial trends prevailing since the mid-thirties in consequence of the war-like expansion of Japanese economy. This would naturally indicate a return to the heavy preponderance of the textile industry. The recent entry of Japanese textile industry into world markets may mean that such developments find Allied encouragement as well as favourable market conditions.

There should also be in post-war Japan considerable development of secondary industries, particularly those requiring a great input of labour. But Japan's erstwhile advantage of low production costs is likely to have gone for ever. The newly found freedom of the trade unions and their vigorous activity in favour of an improvement of labour conditions will probably result in a substantial shift in the distribution of the national income. There can be no doubt, however, that the rise of the standard of living of the Japanese worker, although offsetting some of Japan's pre-war commercial advantages, will eventually operate in Japan's favour through improving the quality of her industrial output and with it her position in international trade.

Indian Foreign Trade

CLOSELY allied to the problems of transition in industry is the problem of the expansion of India's foreign trade. Following the cessation of hostilities, the Government decided to relax Import and Export Controls. About 150 commodities are progressively being released from the purview of Export Control.

As regards imports, it is intended to relax progressively controls in order to facilitate the procurement of the necessary raw materials. In furtherance of this policy, an Open General Licence is now covering a large number of commodities from all sources including hard-currency countries. The restrictive policy on imports from the non-sterling areas like the U.S.A. has also been liberalised; and Indian firms having pre-war trade connections with American suppliers of goods essential for the country's requirements, are allowed to obtain licences for such goods, even when they are otherwise available from the sterling area countries.

The expansion of foreign trade is further facilitated by the resumption of financial and commercial relations with many countries in Europe and Asia previously under enemy occupation. The British territories, Burma, Malaya and Hong Kong, on their liberation returned to their pre-war status as members of the sterling bloc. The freezing orders issued over the accounts of the residents in these territories were withdrawn. As a result of these and other measures, the total value of foreign trade of India during 1945-46 reached a total of Rs.5043.3 million, a record figure during the last sixteen years.

Although exchange control is being continued there has been a substantial relaxation of the rigidity of control. The two tests of "essentiality" and "non-availability" of goods are now applied with more flexibility. Another modification that has been introduced is that the various currencies of the world have been graded in order of the difficulty of their procurement, and the tests of essentiality and non-availability are applied to imports with a decreasing degree of strictness in accordance with comparative easiness of the currency concerned.

A separate post-war Dollar Fund has also been created. To this Fund, the Dollar Pool has contributed 20 million dollars in each of the years 1944 and 1945.

The reconversion of industries is, to a considerable extent, held up by the delay in importing the necessary capital equipment from the U.S.A. and the U.K. The first step, however, in this direction was taken in the Budget proposals for 1946-47 by the grant of the following concessions to industries: (1) abolition of Excess Profit Tax on profit accruing after March 31st, 1946; (2) grant of a special initial depreciation allowance of 10 per cent. on new buildings and 20 per cent. on new plant and machinery as well as allowances for expenditure on scientific research for purpose of income tax; and (3) relief from customs duty on raw materials for industry and reduction of rates on such imported plant and machinery as are now dutiable.

COTTON GROWING IN TAJIK

by Mikhail Petrov

Head of the Cotton Administration in the
Ministry of Agriculture of the U.S.S.R.

Tajikistan covers about 56,000 square miles and lies in the Pamir Mountains, North of Afghanistan. The southern part of the country includes the highest summits of the Soviet Union, the Stalin Peak (24,590 ft.) and the Lenin Peak (23,930 ft.) and has an average elevation of 18,000 ft. It is in the northern lowlands that long-staple cotton forms the chief occupation of 4,000 collective farms. The country is rich in gold, silver, bismuth, arsenic, zinc and tungsten, and uranium is reported to be found in the high slopes. Formerly the Tajiks were amongst the most backward peoples and almost totally illiterate. To-day the republic has four universities and a large number of schools serving 290,000 students, 425 libraries and 17 newspapers. Tajikistan's population numbers about two million.

UP to the advent of Soviet rule very little attention was paid to the development of cotton growing in the fertile areas of the Tajik Republic (the former Eastern Bokhara). In 1913 only 65,000 acres of land were planted to cotton. Primitive implements and methods were employed and the fields yielded negligible harvests of low grade cotton. The richest and most fertile areas—the Vakhsh, Gissar, Beshkent and Kzyl-Sui valleys, although watered by deep rivers, remained uncultivated, and irrigated lands were planted to grain crops, rice, and only an insignificant part to cotton.

During the years of the various Five-Year Plans agriculture in the republic has undergone radical changes. Modern methods and machinery were introduced and the land was planted to valuable crops such as cotton, lucerne, etc. The irrigation problem was solved by the construction of the 100 kilometre Stalin Canal which intersects the Vakhsh valley. This enabled the collective farmers to plant long-staple cotton to thousands of hectares of newly-irrigated land.

The completion of the Tajik section of the Big Fergana Canal has given the Leninabad cotton growers a permanent source of water, and in the Gissar Valley the completion of the first section of the Big Gissar Canal solved the water problem once and for all. With the construction of the second section of this canal the collective farmers of the Tajik Republic, as well as those from Uzbekistan, will receive thousands of acres of fertile soil in the Gissar Valley and the Surkhan-Darya area.

At the same time measures are being taken to cultivate new lands. Thousands of tractor ploughs and cultivators are now operating on the collective farm fields of the republic. Within the next two or three years 90 per

cent. of the ploughing, sowing and cultivation of cotton will be done by machinery. In 1948, the cotton picking machine will be introduced in the plantations of Tajikistan, thus relieving the collective farmers of one of the most arduous processes of field work.

In 1929, Tajik cotton growers began to cultivate valuable long-staple cotton. To-day, nearly 50 per cent. of the entire area under cotton is sown to the selected Nos. 2 and 3 Soviet varieties of this cotton. New and more productive varieties are now being cultivated at the Vakhsh Station, in the home of long-staple cotton. Not only are the cotton growers increasing the area under this crop yearly but they have mastered the "secret" of obtaining high harvests. Hundreds of cotton growers with high crops of cotton to their credit have come to the fore. Their crops are considerably higher than those obtained in the Nile Valley in Egypt.

The Soviet Government has expressed its appreciation of the efforts of these collective farmers by conferring on them the title of Hero of Socialist Labour. Many well-known cotton growers have been awarded orders and medals, and have been given practical aid. Thousands of tons of mineral fertiliser, a large number of tractors and the necessary high quality seed have been supplied to the collective farms. Proper crop rotation of cotton and lucerne has been introduced to raise the fertility of the soil and ensure higher crops.

This spring the work on the fields is being carried out successfully. The Tajikistan cotton growers commenced the sowing ten days earlier than last year. Sturdy sprouts of the long-staple cotton plants appeared and are progressing well. There is no doubt that the next two or three years will raise the agriculture of Tajikistan to a still higher level.

Importing Countries' Rice Allocations ('000 tons)
January-June, 1947.

Exports from	China	India	N.E.I.	Korea U.S. Zone	French Union	Ceylon	Hong Kong	Malaya	Phillip- pines	Borneo
Indo-China	33	15.1	25	7.2	44.7	—	—	—	—	—
Burma	100	386	25	6	—	112	45	116.2	—	—
Siam	100	—	50	25	—	—	35	100	40	25
Total	233	401.1	100	38.2	44.7	112	80	216.2	40	25
Non-Asiatic Countries	12	8.9	—	11.8	—	88	—	8.8	55	—
Grand Total	245	410	100	50	44.7	200	80	225	95	25

ASIA'S FOOD

By a Special Correspondent.

THE food situation in Asia is still marked by a very grave deficiency in caloric intake. Even if the new crops of 1947 should prove good, the acute shortage of rice will continue to present a number of disquieting features.

The supply of rice available for allocation by the International Emergency Food Council in 1946-47 is barely 40 per cent. of the minimum import requirements of the rice-eating countries. It is significant that non-Asiatic sources of supply now play a more important part in rice exports than they did before the war, and there has been a reversal of the pre-war flow of rice exports from East to West. Current prices vary widely from one country to another, and the world rice market is in a highly abnormal state.

The allocation of rice for the first half of this year totals 1,675,000 tons, of which 220,000 tons go to non-Asiatic importing countries, the largest of them Cuba, with an allotment of 100,000 tons. *The distribution of the rest of the tonnage in the Asiatic trade during the period January-June, 1947, is summarised in the table on p. 28.*

The rice industry of the East had suffered great damage as a result of the war and of Japanese invasion; India and other importing countries were cut off from the surplus producing countries occupied by the enemy for a considerable time. Obviously, it will take a number of years before the industry is rehabilitated and adequate reserves are built up for the prevention of famines. During recent international conferences it has been urged by representatives of rice producing countries that better organisation of marketing and the introduction of guaranteed prices for producers holds out the best hope of stimulating rice production. Whatever the ultimate fate of international rice agreements, it seems probable that governments will play a more active role in the future in stimulating production and at the same time controlling prices of rice. The question of great importance to Asia is how soon can such measures be introduced, nationally and internationally?

The characteristics of the economics of rice would indicate that the process will be a very long one. The essential economic fact is that rice is predominantly an Asiatic crop, other countries and areas being of minor importance in the world total. About 95 per cent. of the world's rice is produced and consumed within a group of countries in South-East Asia. While much of the world's wheat is produced by commercial growers on large tracts, rice is produced on innumerable small plots by subsistence farmers. The prevalence of a *subsistence* economy in the major rice growing areas of Asia has been the principal factor impeding the development of marketing practices and milling methods of rice comparable to those of wheat. The competitive pressure of the exporting countries has always been moderate; and the lack of adequate transport made any large-scale movements of rice from the interior to the central markets impracticable.

Furthermore, the absence of common standards of

weights and measures as well as established grades or rice quotations led to the business operations of rice being conducted generally on individualistic lines in the major price exporting countries. Only in Japan was the rice industry better organised than elsewhere in the Far East. Japan, with more favourable climatic conditions, had regularly maintained a considerable stock of ground rice under ideal conditions of storing, ventilating and fumigating. Normally the carry over at the close of the season was equivalent to one month's or six weeks' consumption. Otherwise Asiatic countries possess no system of dealing with rice comparable to the bulk handling of wheat; nor is there in Asia any counterpart of concentrated wheat storage at relatively few points for domestic and overseas markets known to the Western Hemisphere.

In the pre-war period, the per capita wheat and rice consumption in the world as a whole, had both tended to decline, but these lowered consumption levels usually resulted from quite different causes. The decline in wheat consumption has largely reflected a qualitative improvement of diets, whereas the decline of rice consumption is attributed, in part, to the failure of rice production to keep pace with the increase in population in Asiatic countries. The following five-year averages expressed as index numbers suggest that these tendencies have been in evidence in the countries in South-East Asia for at least a quarter of a century.

Period	Rice production	Population	Production per head of population
1921-25 ...	100	100	100
1926-30 ...	100	106	94
1931-35 ...	106	113	94
1936-40 ...	107	120	89

(Source: Food Research Institute, Stanford University, Cal., U.S.A. *The Rice Economy of Monsoon Asia, 1941.*)

While these deficiency trends have been scientifically established attempts to calculate food deficits or shortages in absolute figures for this vast area, which accounts for over 50 per cent. of the world's population or some 1,150 million people, are hazardous indeed. Broad guesses are only possible. Thus the additional bread grain needed during the twelve months commencing July 1st, 1946, after allowing for the use of accumulated stocks and imports of rice from the Americas and Egypt, was estimated at about ten million metric tons, or 375 million bushels wheat equivalent (assuming 90 per cent. extraction).

These estimates are not statements of "requirements" or forecasts of effective demand, but rather indications of the imports which would be needed to offset about one-half of the difference between indigenous grain supplies and the amounts required to bring grain consumption per head back to the pre-war level. However, even the pre-war diet over most of the Far East was too low for promoting health and working efficiency. So far as can be estimated, some 25 million tons (wheat equivalent) of cereals or other staple foods would be needed to raise diets to their full pre-war level in 1947, after allowing for the estimated increases in the rice crop harvested late in 1946.

ECONOMIC NOTES

Trade with Japan.

It was announced in Parliament recently that the Board of Trade are compiling a limited list of representatives of British business interests to go to Japan, in due course, as a preliminary to the resumption of private trade. It is expected that the British quota will include representatives of banking, insurance and shipping as well as merchandising and business interests.

Japan's economic situation criticised.

The present economic situation in Japan was strongly criticised by General Derevyanko, Soviet representative, at the meeting of the Allied Council for Japan on May 14th. He said that a low level of industrial production, shortages of food, raw materials and commodities, widespread profiteering and steadily rising prices resulted in a constant reduction of real wages and in a progressive deterioration of the conditions of workers and office employees. General Derevyanko stated that no serious measures had been taken since Japan's surrender to solve her acute economic problems. The big monopolies continued to retain their dominating position in industry and banking, and a whole series of recommendations submitted by the Allied Council had been ignored, including those aiming at the improvement of the coal industry. The latter, though having preserved 94 per cent. of its pre-war equipment throughout the war, last year produced only 25 per cent. of its pre-war output.

The British representative, Professor W. Macmahon-Ball, agreed with the Soviet view that the present economic situation in Japan was extremely bad, and recalled that one month ago, Britain had presented recommendations regarding the stabilisation of prices and

wages. He added that it would be interesting to know whether the failure to fulfil these plans was the result of deliberate sabotage or of subconscious inertia.

An overall picture.

In a recent statement to the shareholders of the Mercantile Bank of India, the chairman, Sir Charles Innes, stressed these points when speaking of the present situation in the Far East: . . . despite the war difficulties, the business of the Bank has continued to expand . . . business activity in INDIA remained at a high level though inflationary tendencies persist . . . the proportion of Bank advances to Bank deposits there has lately dropped from 49 per cent. to 40 per cent. . . CEYLON trade statistics give an encouraging picture, with total trade of the island rising from Rs. 239 million in 1945 to Rs. 511 million in 1946 . . . unfortunately the cost of production in the tea and rubber industries, the mainstays of the island's economy, have risen steeply during the war, mainly owing to the great increase in the wages of labour . . . in BURMA, the area under rice is about two-thirds of the pre-war acreage . . . the export surplus for 1947 is estimated at 1,060,000 tons of rice . . . the work of rehabilitating Burmese oilfields is going on, but oil is not likely to be produced until some time in 1949 . . . the cost of living in SIAM is estimated to be fifteen times higher than before the war . . . banking operations there have been hampered by Government control . . . Siamese foreign exchange stocks are very low . . . the country's rice export programme is threatened by illicit smuggling and other black market operations . . . in MALAYA the much needed flow of imports has begun and the volume of rubber exports, which amounted to 558,000 tons in 1946, has surprised everybody . . . progress of the tin industry has been slower, due to difficulties of plant replacement and fuel and power shortages . . . recovery in HONG KONG has been remarkable, and the colony did an immense trade in the year, though the export of local manufactures has not yet started to any great extent. The colony enjoys a stable currency security and a good

administration, and the prices of necessities of life supplied are being controlled . . .

Transfer of Java industries.

The Government of Eastern Indonesia intends to transfer certain investments and industries from Java to Eastern Indonesia. The concerns scheduled for transfer in the first instance are said to be the British-American Tobacco Co., the Philips and the Bata Works. As a further measure, Eastern Indonesia intends to nationalise, in due course, railways and the power industry.

K.L.M. service grows.

K.L.M. reports indicate that during 1946, twice as many passengers were carried on the Amsterdam-Batavia route as in 1939. The volume of mail carried increased by some 150 per cent., while freight tonnage transported by the line had increased eightfold.

No wolfram from China and Burma.

The price of ferro-tungsten has been adjusted in the U.K. to the raising of the Ministry of Supply's issue price for standard grade tungsten ore from 100s. to 115s. per unit. The Ministry's new selling price, which took effect on April 23rd, is the highest since August, 1946. The calculations that wolfram supplies would be quickly restored to their pre-war level have been upset by the fact that the world's two main producers—China and Burma—have not yet become available as sources of supply. The Chinese Government has assumed control of wolfram production and it is possible that China intends to turn out ferro-tungsten herself. In Burma production has not progressed as expected, neither in the Tavoy area, where a mixed tin and wolfram ore is obtained, nor in the Mawchi mines, which bear the high quality material. The labour position has been difficult in both areas, and the difficulty in getting new machinery from Britain to replace the one damaged during the Japanese occupation acts as an additional adverse factor.

THIS journal is predominantly intended for circulation in the Far East. It will reach, however, also institutes, organisations and individuals connected with Far Eastern affairs in Europe, America and in the Dominions.

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